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ESSAY 




Conclusions about the bankruptcy system are not in short supply. 
A cursory review of both the academic literature and the popular press 
coverage of bankruptcy in just the past year suggests alternatively that 
the system is excessively costly, has failed miserably, requires substan-
tial amendment, should be repealed, operates effectively in most cases, 
is internally inconsistent, provides an important opportunity to save 
failing businesses, and is manipulated for inappropriate purposes. 
Some charges may be true, and some may not. Embedded within each 
claim, however, are presumptions about the policy objectives of the 
bankruptcy system - presumptions that commentators neither fully 
articulate nor defend. If some of those presumed policy objectives are 
problematic, then any evaluation based on them is necessarily prob-
lematic as well. 
Why have a bankruptcy system? What function is it designed to 
serve? To argue whether it is costly, whether it is failing, or whether it 
should be reshaped, amended, or scrapped, some joinder over what the 
system is designed to do is essential. A success by one normative mea-
sure may be a failure by another. As a result, many of the current 
debates are not about proposed recommendations so much as they are 
debates by proxy over the premises imbedded within those recommen-
dations about whether to have a bankruptcy system at all. 
Notwithstanding an avalanche of writing about bankruptcy and 
the intensity of feelings bankruptcy laws evoke, a thoughtful articula-
tion of bankruptcy policy has fallen on somewhat hard times. Douglas 
Baird and Thomas Jackson have led a skilled, but narrow law-and-
economics challenge to the bankruptcy laws, arguing for greater effi-
* William A. Schnader Professor of Commercial Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S. 
1970, Houston; J.D. 1976, Rutgers, Newark.-Ecl. I am grateful for the detailed comments I 
received from Lucian Bebchuk, Duncan Kennedy, and Kenneth Klee on earlier drafts of this 
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ciency here and there in their relentless march through the various 
sections of the Bankruptcy Code. I They employ a theoretical ap-
proach that values enhanced allocative efficiency, as measured by cer-
tain factors they identify.2 Others, such as Lucian Bebchuk and Mark 
Roe, have specified particular inefficiencies with greater clarity and 
proposed innovative alternative approaches. 3 A number of scholars 
have resisted the Baird and Jackson effort to define the bankruptcy 
debate with passing disapproval of the Bebchuk and Roe positions,4 
1. E.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE Lome AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986) 
(describing a systematic treatment of multiple provisions of the Code); Douglas G. Baird, The 
Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization, lS J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986) (questioning the use-
fulness of chapter 11); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and 
the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, SS U. CHI. L. REv. 738 (1988) (analyzing absolute 
priority rules in chapter 11); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations 
and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured 
Creditors in Bankruptcy, Sl U. CHI. L. REv. 97 (1984) [hereinafter Baird & Jackson, Corporate 
Reorganizations] (analyzing adequate protection in chapter 11); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. 
Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (198S) 
(analyzing fraudulent conveyance rule in leveraged buyouts); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. 
Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1199 (1984) (analyzing 
claims in chapter 11); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An 
Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 7S VA. L. REV. lSS (1989) (discussing 
salvage and the common-pool problem in chapter 11). 
2. Baird and Jackson are primarily interested in the "creditors' bargain heuristic," an ana-
lytic device that focuses on the liquidation and reorganization rights for which creditors would 
have negotiated ex ante in a no-transactions bargaining environment. Robert E. Scott, Through 
Bankruptcy with the Creditors' Bargain Heuristic, S3 U. CHI. L. REV. 690 (1986) (reviewing 
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANK-
RUPTCY (198S)); see Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations, supra note 1, at 97, 110-11. 
They believe business failures create conditions under which the self-interested impulses of indi-
vidual creditors, if left uncontrolled, would place the creditors in costly competition with one 
another for limited resources. Id. at lOS-09. Bankruptcy is a device to channel these creditors by 
force into a coordinated and orderly liquidation of the debtor's assets. Baird and Jackson con-
cede that such a value-enhancing liquidation is a defensible goal of bankruptcy, with the corol-
lary that there is little excuse for a bankruptcy system to reorganize debtors to avoid such a sale. 
Id. The business of bankruptcy is limited to efficient debt collection, not to the rehabilitation of 
the business debtor or to control over the distribution of the debtor's assets. See, e.g., Douglas G. 
Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, S4 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 81S (1987). 
3. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. 
L. REv. 77S (1988) (proposing the issuance of corporate securities to distribute ownership of 
bankrupt company); Mark Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganiza-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. S27 (1983) (proposal to issue warrants to distribute value of bankrupt 
company). 
4. See, e.g., Charles W. Adams, An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorganizations, 20 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 117, 117 (1991) (challenging the conclusions of Baird, Jackson, Roe, and 
Bebchuk for not attaching "sufficient significance to the transaction costs involved in using the 
market to raise the capital necessary to reorganize a corporation's capital structure"); David G. 
Carlson, Game Theory and Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 219, 220 (1992) (crit-
icizing Baird and Picker game theory for "serious blunders in legal research and a priori reason-
ing"); David G. Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 8S MICH. L. REV. 1341 (1987) (criticizing 
Jackson's assumptions and methodology); Theodore Eisenberg, A Bankruptcy Machine that 
Would Go of Itself. 39 STAN. L. REV. 1Sl9, 1S22, 1S29 (1987) (observing that Jackson's ap-
proach downplays the complexity of state law and fails to place bankruptcy law in the proper 
social context); Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of 
Reorganization Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189, 1216 (1991) (concluding that issues in chapter 11 are more 
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but the articulation of alternative points of view has not been nearly so 
coherent and well focused. 
The policies we embrace and the models we use to describe the 
system animate our vision of how the system operates and our conclu-
sions about its successes and failures. If the inquiry over bankruptcy 
policy becomes nothing more than a debate over allocative efficiency, 
it will pass over crucial elements of the policy scheme that cannot be 
so neatly tied up in economic models. An approach that eschews any 
role for efficiency analysis suffers a similar fate, creating an economic 
versus noneconomic dichotomy that negates a realistic appraisal of the 
bankruptcy system. 
This essay is about bankruptcy policy. It attempts to articulate a 
comprehensive statement about the various and competing goals that 
underlie the bankruptcy system. The essay offers both a positive ob-
servation, drawn from the Code and its operation, and a normative 
evaluation, designed to outline the difficult value judgments that com-
prise the bankruptcy system. It also serves warning: before commen-
tators propose any sweeping changes or policymakers take seriously 
any suggestions to scrap the system, they must consider the impact of 
such proposals on a number of competing normative goals. 
My decision to make this piece an essay - short on footnotes and 
written in moderately plain English - is a deliberate strategic, as well 
as stylistic, choice. No doubt many of the propositions put forth here 
could be restated in a fashionable economic lingo, mathematical for-
mulations, or game-theory hypotheses. Such approaches might yield 
gains in precision that would test the outer reaches of the ideas. It is 
also possible that much of what I say here could be restated in other 
ways: with reference to philosophy, political economy, or other schol-
arly fields from which the ideas might be borrowed, re-formed, and 
applied by more or less successful analogy. Such approaches might 
prove my own erudition, and they might add other insights to the dis-
cussions as well. But I leave those formulations for another day. 
Bankruptcy policy debates suffer enough from communication 
problems. Not only do some academics seem more interested in dis-
course-as-war-take-no-prisoners than in the expansion of the collective 
complex than Baird, Jackson, and Roe suggest); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A 
Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 721 (1991) (arguing that the "economic 
account [of bankruptcy] is deeply flawed" and the view of what makes it "'distinct' is mis· 
guided"); Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationality in Bankruptcy Decisionmaking, 33 WM. & 
MARYL. REV. 333 (1992) (making the same argument); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: 
A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEXAS L. ;R.Ev. 51, 55, 59 (1992) (arguing crcdi· 
tor's bargain theory ignores reality). 
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understanding of the bankruptcy system's operation, 5 they a1so seem 
to care less and less about any readership outside a handful of other 
academics. 6 While the latter point might be dismissed as simply a 
poke at academic snobbery, it has. fundamenta1 ramifications for a de-
bate about policy proscriptions. Thoughtful, useful policy debates are 
informed by a number of perspectives, including those that do not 
originate within the academic community. The identification of 
problems and the development of solutions depend on a clear under-
standing of how the system functions. The role of the academic. to 
provide an abstract model to explain the system or to offer new in-
sights based on deductive reasoning can be enormously va1uable. If, 
however, the academic contribution to the policy debates is deliber-
ately insulated from give-and-take with those who participate in the 
development and implementation of these laws, such contribution will 
necessarily be stunted and uninformed. 7 
A robust debate should include a variety of approaches to the 
questions at hand and a number of different proposa1s for considera-
tion. Ideas from other disciplines and new generations of contrary 
thinkers invigorate us. When we talk about bankruptcy policy, how-
ever, we.also need a center, some sense of shared ideas about the sys-
tem's purpose. I believe this approach requires an articulation of the 
normative goals of the system that scholars, practitioners, judges, and 
legislators can share. Some may shade their description of the system 
in one directic~n, and others may explore subset issues in greater detail. 
In either case, there is little to gain by loud arguments with no joinder 
5. Perhaps my own scholarship, which has been sharply critical of deceptive empirical work, 
fits within this description. See Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Dis-
charge: An Analysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1091; Elizabeth Warren, The 
Untenable Case/or Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992) [hereinafter Warren, Unten-
able Case for Repeal]. I like to think those critiques are designed to preserve the marketplace of 
ideas rather than to destroy it, but I am certain my targets would see that differently. My debates 
with Professor Baird have been vigorous affairs as well, but our shared aspiration was that the 
form of point-counterpoint would sharpen the issues-not drive a discussant from the field. See 
Baird, supra note 2; Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 776 (19~7). I 
recognize that I may only flatter myself with my supposed good intentions. I intend here only to 
express my fear that some of the attacks and counterattacks on the issue of bankruptcy do not 
seem to advance an understanding of the bankruptcy system so much as they attract attention for 
the proponent at the expense of thoughtful exchange. I believe the observation is worthy of 
consideration, even if some readers would characterize me as a miscreant. 
6. One scholar working in the commercial law area has repeatedly claimed that he writes 
only for "seven important people." While I remain amazed that someone would deliberately 
write for an audience that would fit comfortably into a minivan, I speculate from reading a 
number of law review articles that they are also written to impress equally small audiences. 
7. See John D. Ayer, So Near to Cleveland, So Far from God: An Essay on the Ethnography 
of Bankruptcy, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 407 (1992) (discussing the tradition in bankruptcy law of 
prominent academics influencing the bankruptcy system while they maintain close interest in 
practice). 
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of issue or by refusals to acknowledge substantial commonality. If we 
have some shared vision of the enterprise, the odds are greater that we 
can build on each other's insights and bring our collective intellectual 
energies to greater fruition - and that we can reduce the energy re-
quired to separate out work with little merit. 
I am mindful of the discomfort that accompanies normative dis-
cussions about policymaking. As Duncan Kennedy has pointed out 
with some force, our attraction to an efficiency analysis stems from its 
apparent value-neutral base. It offers us the opportunity to avoid 
much more uncomfQrtable discussions about values and politics that 
inhere in discussions about redistribution and paternalism. 8 But, as 
Kennedy also demonstrates, the insulation from value judgments that 
economic analysis offers is illusory, providing only indeterminate solu-
tions. 9 Economic analysis plays a significant role in describing the op-
eration of the bankruptcy system and identifies important normative 
objectives in the system. 10 Nevertheless, neither the discomfort in ar-
ticulating the alternative values at stake nor the impossibility of defin-
ing an overarching moral theory of behavior excuses those who work 
with policy questions from dealing with the distributive issues that 
bankruptcy policy implicates. 
The list of policy goals I offer is deliberately open textured. An-
other reader might divide the list more finely from four items to six or 
eight or recombine them to two or three. It is also possible that this 
essay omits aspects of the system such that one could usefully rearticu-
late it by refining and adding to what is here. The reader, however, 
should not mistake this flexibility as a suggestion that "anything 
goes." Such an approach yields little that is useful. The statement of 
goals this essay presents is intended to be a direct challenge to every-
one who worries about the bankruptcy system: Can we live with this 
definition of the core issues? Will the law-and-economics crowd admit 
that more than allocative efficiency is at stake? Will everyone else ad-
mit to the importance of efficiency analysis? Can we find ways to deal 
with conflicting goals that will, for example, account for increased 
inefficiency while meeting important distributive goals? Will a clearer 
articulation of the spectrum of issues at stake stop the judgments 
about the effectiveness of the system that conclude so many law review 
8. Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. 
REV. 387 (1981) [hereinafter Kennedy, Entitlement Problems]; Duncan Kennedy, Distributive 
and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms 
and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Mo. L. REV. 563 (1982). 
9. See Kennedy, Entitlement Problems, supra note 8. 
10. Even Kennedy did not argue that all ~onomic analysis should stop. Instead he stated 
that the notion of efficiency in law and economics "has a limited heuristic usefulness." Id. at 444. 
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articles but that are based only upon a single policy consideration? I 
hope for some agreement, but, if such a consensus does not come to 
pass, I hope at least for joinder of issue in our continuing debates. 
I. SETTING THE STAGE FOR A POLICY DISCUSSION: BUSINESS 
FAILURES AND CONSUMER FAILURES 
I begin this essay with the same limitation that Professor Baird and 
I imposed on our earlier debates: this piece explores the policy aspects 
of business bankruptcies.11 The justification for doing so now is the 
same as it was then: the financial collapse of individuals raises social 
and economic questions that are far beyond the scope of the issues 
addressed in this essay. A single bankruptcy code encompasses both 
business and consumer bankruptcies, and both types of cases employ a 
common language. Nevertheless, they are in fact two distinct systems 
operating under very different constraints and moving toward different 
objectives.12 
The differences between the two systems are many. Financially 
troubled individuals cannot be dissolved the way insolvent corpora-
tions can, and individual debtors continue to consume and produce 
while their corporate counterparts may disappear once their assets are 
disbursed among their creditors. Consumer bankruptcy policy rightly 
concerns itself with the fresh start in ways that are not nearly so press-
ing for corporate debtors. Moreover, the incentive effects of bank-
ruptcy laws on families struggling with large mortgages, job layoffs, or 
overwhelming medical debts are not the same as the incentive effects 
on companies making investment and asset-deployment decisions that 
will affect how they meet their environmental cleanup obligations, 
whether they can fund their pension plans, and how many jobs they 
will continue to support. Analogies between the two may sometimes 
be apt, but the circumstances differ sufficiently to justify discrete pol-
icy discussions.13 
11. This essay is an extension of earlier conversations with Douglas Baird. See Baird, supra 
note 2; Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note S. 
12. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 
(2d ed. 1991), defends, in greater detail, the view that the two systems differ in sufficiently impor-
tant ways to be treated as two distinct systems. Others have followed that position elsewhere; for 
example, an increasing number of casebooks distinguish the treatment of consumer cases from 
that of business cases. See, e.g .• JAMES J. WHITE & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, BANKRUPTCY 
(1992) (concentrating almost exclusively on "business bankruptcy"). 
13. Notwithstanding these obvious differences, the scholarly analysis of bankruptcy fre-
quently blurs this distinction. In the most recent summary of the bankruptcy field, for example, 
Professors Epstein, Nickles, and White have written a three-volume treatise, DAVID G. EPSTEIN 
ET AL., BANKRUPTCY (1992), that makes the technical aspects of the statute the uniting feature 
with scant attention to the differences between the bankruptcy of Johns-Manville and Jane Jones. 
The authors have special sections on the differences between chapter 7, chapter 11, chapter 12, 
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I reserve questions about individual bankruptcy for my work on 
individual debtors, which I continue to pursue. A note of reservation 
is appropriate, however, in identifying the scope of this inquiry. While 
the consumer-business distinction is critical to understanding the oper-
ation of the bankruptcy system, it breaks down at the margins. The 
line between a small business debtor and an individual debtor is often 
only a formal distinction. Individuals in bankruptcy are dispropor-
tionately the owners of small businesses, 14 and businesses in bank-
ruptcy are overwhelmingly smaller businesses that are not publicly 
traded. 15 Individual !>ankruptcy petitions often accompany the small-
est business bankruptcies as well, suggesting a significant crossover of 
policy considerations. Questions about how to deal with the smallest 
business bankruptcies appropriately also invoke issues about how to 
deal with their bankrupt owners. 
The discussion in this essay takes as its prototype the somewhat 
larger business, one that operates as more than a single-person unit. 
Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that a small-business, big-
business distinction may also be in order. The circumstances of 
owner-operated businesses may differ from those of larger companies 
in ways that influence important policy considerations. In small busi-
nesses, for example, identity between equity and management is often 
perfect. Consequently, rules about equity participation in closely held 
businesses have a very different impact than they would in big busi-
nesses, in which professional management teams are not necessarily 
interested in protecting the interests of equity owners. Similarly, in 
small businesses the ability to produce value may depend much more 
critically on the presence of a particular manager, whereas the man-
agement teams of larger businesses are more fungible. 
and chapter 13, id. §§ 1-8 to 1-10, but they cover most materials without reference to the under-
lying context in which they arise. While this treatise - intended for practitioners, teachers, and 
students - makes few policy evaluations, it nonetheless represents the system as a single, unified 
abstraction. Similarly, a number of casebooks about bankruptcy take the same abstract ap-
proach, combining mastery of consumer bankruptcy with mastery of business bankruptcies in a 
largely seamless web. The exception, in most books, is the identification of the chapter 13 wage-
earner plan, which, as a matter oflaw, is available only to individuals. While authors necessarily 
get this provision in some context, other provisions mix consumer and business cases at will. See, 
e.g., ARNOLD B. COHEN & LEON S. FORMAN, BANKRUPTCY, ARTICLE 9 AND CREDITORS' 
REMEDIES (2d ed. 1989). 
14. About 20% of the individual debtors in bankruptcy are either currently self-employed or 
were formerly self-employed at the time they file for bankruptcy. This shows an overrepresenta-
tion of failed entrepreneurs in bankruptcy, because only about seven percent of the working 
population generally is self-employed. TER_ESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR 
DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 111 (1989). 
15. Less than one-tenth of one percent of the debtors filing for chapter 11 are publicly traded 
companies. Warren, Untenable Case for Repeal, supra note 5, at 441. For a discussion of the 
differences between the ways in which large and small companies may experience bankruptcY., 
see id. at 442-43. 
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It may be that the distinctions between small and big businesses 
are sufficiently important that at some junctures bankruptcy policies 
would appropriately diverge for different ltjnds of business debtors. 16 
While I do not sustain that distinction throughout· these materials, I 
recognize that, to move from abstraction to application, such a distinc-
tion might become increasingly important. 
II. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
This description of the functions of the business bankruptcy system 
begins with a factual observation: when a business fails, there is a 
substantial risk that it will not have sufficient resources to meet all its 
outstanding obligations. To complicate this proble;m, businesses rarely 
fail after neatly wrapping up all their outstanding obligations. Instead, 
they tend to falter during active, sometimes frantic, operations, leaving 
contracts in various ·states of performance and nonperformance; owing 
past-due bills along with contingent future obligations; and disap-
pointing legions of suppliers, employees, customers, creditors, and 
others who fear that they will not get all they had· expected from their 
dealings with the debtor. Some entity or group of entities will likely 
bear the losses of the business' inability to meet its obligations. 
It is possible to have a legal regime with no formal bankruptcy 
system, but it is not possible to avoid legal rules that deal with the 
consequences of business failure. Some rules must determine the 
rights of the contract claimants and tort victims, banks and employees, 
or suppliers and customers when the pool of the debtor's assets rapidly 
diminishes and the claimants clamor for satisfaction. We might inte-
grate such rules into a single system or scatter them throughout the 
collection system. We may construct them deliberately or inadver-
tently. We may also call them "bankruptcy" or "rutabaga" or any 
other fanciful word. Regardless of these elements, the rules will create 
a collection system that determines the value of a faiiing business, how 
to distribute that value among parties whom the failure affects, and the 
extent to which affected parties can externalize the costs of failure to 
others who did not deal with .. the debtor. 
In bankruptcy a single federal system that supersedes state law col-
lection priority rules brings together the collection rules. This system 
16. Professors Baird and Picker and I defend, for example, different rationales for the-abso-
lute priority rule in the case of small, closely held businesses and large, publicly held businesses. 
We disagree on what that policy should be, but we all recognize the different kinds of yalue a rule 
should protect in small and large business cases. Compare Elizabeth Warren,:#. Theory of Abso-
lute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9, 11-19 with Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A 
Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 
(1991). 
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aims, with greater or lesser efficacy, toward four principal goals: (1) to 
enhance the value of the failing debtor; (2) to distribute value accord-
ing to multiple normative principles; (3) to internalize the costs of the 
business failure to the parties dealing with the debtor; and (4) to create 
reliance on private monitoring. In this section, I consider each of 
these functions in turn, exploring both the normative values at stake 
and the ways in which the current bankruptcy system implements 
these goals. 
A. A System To Enhance Value 
The rules that govern the management of a failing business affect 
the value of the business. Congress recognized that, if legal rules make 
it difficult for a troubled firm to survive or if they increase the costs of 
operation, value will necessarily decline sharply when a firm is in 
trouble. Conversely, if the rules give the business opportunities to re-
organize its debt and offer protection from collecting creditors, the 
rules will prop up the value of the troubled business. 
One of the principal functions of bankruptcy law is to enhance the 
value of a failing firm. The normative analysis is fairly straightfor-
ward: if the rule can increase the value of the failing firm, it will re-
duce the total costs imposed on the parties dealing with the failing 
debtor. If the cost of producing the increase in value is less than the 
value obtained, then the rule has increased net values, which is the 
desired result.17 
This goal, which focuses on the allocative efficiency of the bank-
ruptcy system, is implemented through reduction in collection costs 
and retention of value that a state collection action would otherwise 
dissipate. The positive analysis is equally straightforward: key ele-
ments of the bankruptcy system were created to accomplish this cost 
savings and value conservation. Congress used four principle devices: 
(1) development of specialized collection rules; (2) implementation of 
collective creditor action; (3) reduction in the strategic behavior of 
debtors and creditors; and (4) preservation of the business' going-con-
cern value. 
17. The business' competitors, however, do not view the survival of a troubled business posi-
tively. In the airline industry, for example, more successful airlines want less successful airlines 
to be put out of business immediately in order to reduce the number of carriers and to increase 
their own market share. The successful airlines' public relations campaign serves as a reminder 
that our economic system is deeply interrelated; no disaster is bad for everyone, and no success is 
good for everyone. In· this case, however, decreasing competition so that the survivors can be-
come more profitable is not in line with widely accepted economic or normative principles. 
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1. Creating Specialized Collection Rules 
Because legal obligations are rarely self-executing, collection rules 
emerge that define the rights of parties to extract payment when others 
fail to meet their obligations. These rules define how one party forces 
another to pay, as they also - deliberately or inadvertently - order 
the priority of repayment among different creditors who have collec-
tion rights. Both federal bankruptcy law and state debtor-creditor law 
define the rules of debt collection, but the goals of the two systems 
differ markedly, resulting in very different applicable rules in each 
system. 
The principal objective of state collection law is to provide a single 
creditor with an avenue to pursue the collection of an unpaid obliga-
tion. Some creditors bring collection suits because a debtor denies lia-
bility on a debt, while others do so when the debtor is slow to pay. 
State collection law is routinized, depending heavily on legal rights 
determined elsewhere in the trial court system. It embodies a series of 
formalistic rules with a narrow factual inquiry leading to the eventual 
liquidation of the debtor's assets. While its effectiveness in dealing 
with a recalcitrant debtor may be questionable, the routine work of the 
state system is to provide a relatively low-cost, minimal-inquiry system 
to collect legal obligations. 
The issues at stake in a typical business failure, however, are sub-
stantively different from those in routine state law collection suits. 
When a debtor faces failure, the possibility of default on a number of 
outstanding obligations or of a complete cessation of business activities 
transforms collection issues. Any single collection effort against a fail-
ing debtor necessarily affects the likelihood of collection by all other 
creditors. If one creditor were able to collect a large judgment in full, 
for example, the debtor might have too few assets to pay what it owes 
to other, similarly situated creditors. Moreover, since the debtor may 
cease doing business altogether if one creditor enforces its rights, the 
exercise of collection rights implicates larger social and economic is-
sues as well: workers may lose jobs, taxing authorities may lose rat-
ables, trade creditors may lose customers, and so on. 
While state law deals with routine single-debt collections, bank-
ruptcy laws deal specifically with the more complex issues raised in the 
context of impending multiple default. When the debtor faces failure, 
questions of the priority of repayment and discharge from debt be-
come central to the collection process. Bankruptcy laws are developed 
explicitly to order priority of repayment, providing a far more com-
plex scheme to establish deliberate priority rules among hundreds of 
possible competing claimants. Moreover, the bankruptcy court may 
346 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:336 
conduct wide-ranging factual inquiries and give all interested creditors 
an opportunity to discuss a broad range of matters that might affect 
the likelihood of their repayment. 
To be sure, bankruptcy law is not the only source of collection 
priority rules. State collection laws also create some collection priori-
ties. In giving some creditors an exclusive right to reach certain prop-
erty, or in allowing some creditors speedier access to the collection 
system, the state law system necessarily creates a repayment priority 
that will affect the creditors of a failing debtor. I develop this point in 
greater detail in section II.B, which deals with distributional issues, 
but the relevant point in this section focuses only on system specializa-
tion. The state system does not require, nor even provide, an opportu-
nity for the searching inquiry about the implications of debtor default 
that inhere in the development of a bankruptcy scheme. 
In the current scheme, state collection law and federal bankruptcy 
law together form a specialized, yet flexible collection system. State 
law delineates a circumscribed set of procedures for balancing the in-
terests of a nonpaying debtor and a collecting creditor, creating a sys-
tem that accommodates a limited factual inquiry and that is readily 
accessible for resolving routine collection disputes. Federal law cre-
ates a multifaceted, integrated system to cope with the competing con-
cerns of a wider range of interested parties in more complicated 
relationships and more distressed circumstances. It incorporates and 
overrides the state priority system. The national system thus ad-
dresses a number of normative concerns that arise in connection with 
the potential demise qf an ongoing business, which need not be raised 
in every collection action. These different collection systems offer a 
measure of flexibility by providing fora that are reasonably calculated 
to resolve the disputed issues in different kinds of cases. At the same 
time, they minimize total collection costs by invoking a complex sys-
tem only when more complex issues are at stake. In addition, they 
provide a law that is deliberately distributional, based on a collection 
of principles discussed later in this paper .. 
2. Enhancing Collective Action 
The Bankruptcy Code reduces the costs of collection from a trou-
bled debtor by collectivizing creditor activities. By replacing the com-
petitive state law collection systems, in which each creditor engages in 
separate monitoring and collection activities, with a collective-action 
system, the bankruptcy mechanism attempts to achieve significant cost 
savings. The primary collective device in the Ba~ruptcy Code is the 
creditors' committee, an elective group that hires a single counsel and 
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its own team of experts to monitor the progress of the bankruptcy case 
and to protect the rights of the creditors generally. 18 The creditors' 
committee is designed to accomplish effective creditor involvement at 
the lowest possible costs. Coinmittee expenses are paid from assets of 
· the estate, resulting in a cost spreading that may" a1so enhance the ef-
fectiveness of the monitoring and creditor participation.19 
In addition, the interests of the creditors are represented by offi-
cia1s paid by the debtor's estate but who are responsible to the credi-
tors as a group. In chapter 7 cases, a trustee is appointed to act on 
behalf of all the creditors. 20 The U.S. Trustee, a representative of the 
Justice Department, has both general supervisory responsibility for 
these appointed trustees and the power to enter a case if there is reason 
to believe that they are not adequately representing the creditors' in-
terests. 21 In a chapter 11 case, the debtor's management team is left in 
place unless a party makes an affirmative showing that a trustee is 
needed to protect creditors' interests.22 As a result, the U.S. Trustee 
exercises somewhat more aggressive supervisory powers in reorganiza-
tion cases. The U.S. Trustee monitors the activities of the debtor in 
possession,, reviews the progress of th~ chapter 11 case, supervises 
creditors' committees in the exercise of their functions, and intervenes 
if it believes creditors' interests are not adequately represented.23 
Savings are also realized by imposing stiff requirements on debtors 
to cooperate with creditors' efforts to monitor a troubled business. A 
few examples illustrate the point. Following a bankruptcy filing, the 
debtor must reveal detailed information about the past operation of 
the business and its projected business activities. 24 This requirement 
makes it easier to determine what has happened to the business and to 
scrutinize the future disposition of its assets. The debtor is restricted 
to activities undertaken in the ordinary course of its business, which 
prevents the- debtor from concealing or otherwise moving assets to 
18. 11 u.s.c. §§ 705, 1102 (1988). 
19. 11 U.S.C. §§ 503{b), 1103{a) (1988). The chapter 11 system is premised on the active 
participation of creditors who will be most affected by the outcome. If such creditors do not in 
fact participate, there is no one to implement many of the benefits available to creditors. For 
example, if creditors do not supervise, lawyers may serve as counsel to the creditors' committee, 
running up fees and producing little benefit. There are both empirical questions about the opera-
tion of creditors' committees and policy questions about designing systems that do not realisti-
cally reflect the circumstances of most parties who use it, but I must reserve both questions for 
another day. For now, it is important to note the design structure that permits creditors to act 
collectively to reduce their costs. 
20. 11 u.s.c. §§ 701, 702 (1988). 
21. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(l)-{3) (1988). 
22. 11 u.s.c. §§ 1104, 1107 (1988). 
23. 28 u.s.c. § 586 (1988). 
24. 11 U.S.C. § I 106(a) (1988). 
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make collection difficult.25 If the debtor wishes to engage in out-of-
the-ordinary transactions, it must notify its creditors and seek court 
approval. 26 Debtors who violate such rules may find their manage-
ment replaced by a trustee who reports directly to the court and the 
creditors. 27 
To further the collective interests of the creditors, the Bankruptcy 
Code operates directly to reduce the costs of coping with a business 
failure. A number of provisions are designed to increase collection 
efficiency in a bankruptcy action; quick decisions, abbreviated trials, 
estimation of claims, elimination of duplicate efforts, restricted notifi-
cation requirements, reduced waiting periods, minimal paperwork, au-
tomatic st~ys from collection, stipulated valuations, and emergency 
orders are all bankruptcy devices intended to capture value for the 
estate under the adverse conditions that multiparty litigation and a 
failing business present.28 Perhaps no part of the legal system is more 
cognizant of the transaction costs of collection and dispute resolution 
than the bankruptcy system, and surely no system is so conspicuously 
directed toward cost reduction. 
3. Reducing Strategic Behavior 
Strategic, and often wasteful, action is a persistent problem in col-
lection systems. Under any system, both debtors and creditors can be 
counted on to press whatever advantages they may have. Exploitation 
of superior information or greater bargaining power, for example, is an 
expected - and, according to most commentators, beneficial - aspect 
of the contract-bargaining process. 29 But some advantages arise be-
cause of differences among legal systems or because ineffectual laws 
permit parties to avoid the enforcement of rights they long ago bar-
gained away. Such advantages create a wasteful, ex ante exploitation 
25. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(c), 1106(a) (1988). 
26. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988). 
27. 11 u.s.c. § 1104 (1988). 
28. One of the most cost-effective uses of bankruptcy may be to bring a number of similar 
lawsuits against a debtor - such as those from the tort claimants in A.H. Robins or Johns-
Manville - into a single forum for much less costly resolution than the case-by-case adjudication 
that would have taken place at state law. For a discussion of similar proposals for mass joinder 
and resolution of toxic exposure cases outside the bankruptcy system, see David Rosenberg, The 
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 849 (1984). 
29. The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, denies enforcement of unconscionable con-
tract clauses, which it defines in U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1992). The Code drafters made clear, how-
ever, that the principle does not include "disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior 
bargaining power." U.C.C. § 2-302(1) cmt. 1. Parties are expected to take advantage of superior 
information and strength in the marketplace in the statute that is most central to the regulation 
of commercial contracts. 
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that drives up collection costs. Attempts to take advantage of oppor-
tunities that the collection system creates dissipate both debtors' and 
creditors' resources while producing little identifiable benefit. 
Disparate collection systems, such as those in the fifty states, often 
provide fertile ground for nonproductive strategic behavior. 30 While 
state law systems do not sanction debtor misbehavior, they nonethe-
less hinder the creditor's preemptive and remedial strikes.31 If the 
debtor is sophisticated, the opportunities to play this game, both 
before and after judgments are rendered and collection efforts have 
begun, are almost limitless. 
The debtor most likely to engage in wasteful strategic behavior is 
the one facing business failure. This debtor has the least to lose and 
the most to gain from such strategies. Developing a unifonp. federal 
bankruptcy law that stretches across the nation - and has some inter-
national reach - can better control the circumstances most fraught 
with the potential for waste. A single bankruptcy filing creates an es-
tate that nets all the debtor's property, wherever located, and covers 
all the debtor's economic relationships, in whatever stage of perform-
ance or breach. 32 To resolve their claims, all creditors must come to a 
single forum where they are assured of notice and an opportunity to be 
heard before the debtor's assets are distributed. The sweep of bank-
ruptcy law and the applicable rules are essentially the same regardless 
of where the business files or which bankruptcy court issues the or-
ders. The reach and uniformity of bankruptcy law sharply reduce the 
opportunities for strategic behavior. 
Bankruptcy law does not eliminate strategic behavior, however, 
and sometimes it fosters new stratagems and delays. Opportunities for 
strategic delay are in some instances the result of poorly considered 
Code provisions; in others, they are the unavoidable consequence of a 
careful balance between debtor and creditor power. Some debtors fo-
rum shop, looking for marginal advantages in different courts. 33 
30. The debtor facing coercive state collection actions can sometimes avoid them by moving 
property to another location. For example, simply by driving its equipment across a state line, a 
debtor can force its creditor to begin the collection process anew in a different state forum -
assuming, of course, that the creditor is able to find the equipment in its new home. 
31. State law allows creditors to make certain countermoves - such as sequestering property 
before judgment - but the laws make such moves expensive. Moreover, because these laws 
trigger constitutional concerns about deprivation of property without due process, a number of 
procedural and substantive safeguards hem in creditors' remedies. When applied against a wily 
debtor, these remedies are of doubtful effectiveness. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying 
text. 
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988). 
33. Evidence suggests that some large debtors considering chapter 11 forum shop, looking 
for judges who will interpret the flexible rules on plan exclusivity and attorneys' fees most favora-
bly to debtors and their counsel. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and 
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Nonetheless, a national bankruptcy system can minimize strategic be-
havior in ways that the disparate state collection systems could never 
accomplish. Opportunities for debtors' strategic behavior in bank-
ruptcy should always be compared with the opportunities for strategic 
behavior that exist within the state collection scheme. 
4. Retaining Value in the Failing Business 
The rationale commentators most often cite for a bankruptcy sys-
tem is its ability to capture the going-concern value of a business; for 
many analysts, the function of bankruptcy - and hence the measure 
of its viability - begins and ends here. 34 This feature is undoubtedly a 
significant part of the bankruptcy scheme, but the opportunity to pre-
serve the full value of the business has broader implications than sim-
ply the capture of going-concern rather than liquidation valuations. 
Two empirically based economic assumptions underlie the attempt 
to preserve the value of a failing company: (1) orderly liquidation is 
likely to produce more value - or to avoid more loss - than piece-
meal liquidation; and (2) going-concern value is likely to be higher 
than liquidation value. Chapter 7 implements the first premise by re-
quiring an organized liquidation, monitored by all the creditors and 
supervised by the bankruptcy court, that presumably produces greater 
value than the chaotic mix of self-help repossession and judicial execu-
tion available at state law. The chapter 11 reorganization alternative 
implements the second premise, explicitly attempting to capture the 
going-concern value of a business that would likely be lost in any liqui-
dation. The sale of an intact business might occur in either chapter 7 
or chapter 11, retaining the excess value for the bankruptcy estate. 
Like any other empirical observation, these factual 'presumptions 
underlying the bankruptcy system are subject to challenge. It may be 
that orderly liquidation yields no premium for the creditors, or that a 
going-co;ncern value differs from liquidation value only in an irrational 
market that does not exist. There is ample evidence of the persistent 
belief in a going-concern differential in liquidation. 35 In addition, the 
Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. 
L. REV. 11, 12. 
34. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations, supra note 1, at 100-01 (asserting 
that. bankruptcy policy, rests on a premise of enhancing the value of the failing company); 
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J, 
1043 (1!192) (same). 
35. See, e.g., Jn re Wine Boutique, Inc., 117 B.R. 506 (Ban~r. W.D. Mo. 1990) (bankruptcy 
sale of going-concern business yields more than sale of assets individually); Kenneth N. Klee, 
Chapter 11: The Commercial Creditor's Best Friend, COM. LENDING REV., Winter 1992-93, at 
44, 48 (citing e~amples of companies that were sold intact in bankruptcy to yield the highest 
possible prices). 
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price premium paid outside bankruptcy for intact businesses36 sup-
ports the conclusion that both orderly liquidations and reorganiza-
tions of operating businesses enhance the value of the bankrupt estate, 
but it certainly does not prove this claim. 
To make liquidations orderly and to attempt to capture a going-
concern premium, the bankruptcy system embodies overtly utilitarian 
principles. A creditor with a state law right to repossess collateral, for 
example, m,ay be forced to relinquish that right in bankruptcy if the 
debtor business is more valuable when the property remains in place. 37 
The individual creditor loses something by forgoing immediate l!qui-
dation and waiting for continuing payments. Yet, the business - and 
all those who rely on the business - gains from the opportunity to 
liquidate in a more orderly fashion, to sell itself as a going-concern, or 
to reorganize itself into a viable enterprise. 
Bankruptcy laws also enhance the value of the failing company by 
reducing creditors' incentives to dismantle it. Under state law, un-
secured creditors who are quickest to act against a failing debtor may 
suffer no losses, while those who work with the debtor and hesitate to 
seize critical property bear the entire burden if the debtor's assets are 
depleted before they collect. State law rewards creditors for racing to 
grab assets and thereby encourages behavior that dismantles debtors in 
distress and precipitates business failures that might have been averted 
if the creditors had been more patient. The state system distributes 
benefits to aggressive creditors rather than cooperative ones; it thus 
tends to raise business failure rates generally. The bankruptcy system 
denies creditors access to more aggressive collection methods, such as 
immediate foreclosure, and ends the race to dismantle the debtor. 
Moreover, because the collection rules of bankruptcy have some retro-
active application - for example, the return of preferential payments 
received within three months of a bankruptcy filing38 - bankruptcy 
laws may serve not only to enhance the value of a business that has 
filed bankruptcy, but also· to improve the value of a business that is 
foundering on the brink of a bankruptcy filing. 
Bankruptcy courts also directly influence efforts to enhance the 
value of the bankruptcy estate. These courts enjoy enormous discre-
36. Some describe the price differential as the "good will" of the company, a somewhat 
ephemeral term that may encompass more than just the going-concern value. E.g., BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 625 (5th ed. 1979) {defining goodwill as "excess of cost of an acquired firm or 
operating unit over the current or fair market value of net assets of the acquired unit. Informally 
used to indicate the value of good customer relations, high employee morale, a well-respected 
business name, etc., which are expected to result in greater than normal earning power"). 
37. 11 u.s.c. § 362{d)(2) (1988) .. 
38. 11 u.s.c. § J47(b) (1988). 
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tionary power that they can use to enhance the value of a failing busi-
ness. Judges must make countless decisions - whether to permit the 
assumption of an executory contract, to appoint an examiner, or to 
approve the terms of a postpetition financing agreement - based on 
their assessment of what will yield the largest returns for the estate.39 
In addition, a number of statutory provisions specifically require the 
court to exercise commercial judgment. For example, the judge must 
choose between competing valuations to decide whether a debtor may 
substitute collateral, or to evaluate business projections to determine if 
a reorganization plan is reasonably calculated to support its proposed 
payout. 40 These fact-specific inquiries demand that judges make care-
ful business decisions, as well as thoughtfully apply legal principles. 
The most frequently discussed policy rationale for the bankruptcy 
system is its stated goal to enhance the value of the failing business, 
thereby reducing the collective losses suffered by the parties who have 
dealt with the debtor. The bankruptcy laws create a specialized collec-
tion system that uses a number of different devices to maintain the 
value of the failing firm. The Code actively promotes collective action 
for the creditors while it hems in the strategic behavior of the debtor 
that can dissipate the estate assets. By giving the business an opportu-
nity for organized liquidation or for reorganization as a going concern, 
the laws also help retain the value of the debtor business. 
B. A System To Distribute Value 
Any collection system necessarily has significant distributional im-
plications because it fixes legal rights and creates priorities of repay-
ment that represent the basis for participation in any renegotiation 
effort. Imbedded within state collection law is a straightforward 
scheme of distribution: secured creditors get cash or take their collat-
eral; the first judgment creditor collects in full from what remains; the 
next judgment creditor takes in full from what still remains; and so on, 
until all the assets are gone.41 This payment scheme is augmented by 
statutory lien and trust fund laws that give certain creditors automatic 
priorities, without reference to their contractual rights. So long as the 
debtor pays the remainder of its obligations as they mature, seizure of 
property by one creditor creates no inequality among creditors; the 
others can still expect to be paid in full. When there are insufficient 
assets to satisfy all claims against the debtor, however, the state collec-
39. 11 u.s.c. §§ 365, 1104, 363 (1988). 
40. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 1129(a)(ll) (1988). 
41. u.c.c. § 9-301(4) (1988). 
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tion scheme permits some creditors to receive payment in full while 
other creditors bear all the costs of a debtor's failure. Whether such 
distributional schemes are advertent or are merely the result of provid-
ing better protection for some interest groups - such as the prefer-
ence for contract-based claimants over tort-based claimants or 
landlords over tenants - is an interesting point for political specula-
tion. Whether or not the system is advertent, however, the state law 
system has a powerful distributional impact when the debtor fails. 
The bankruptcy system reflects a deliberate decision to pursue dif-
ferent distributional objectives from those that the de facto scheme of 
general collection law embodies. Rejecting the "race of the diligent" 
that characterizes state law, the bankruptcy system substitutes a differ-
ent normative principle: "equity is equality." The Bankruptcy Code 
begins with the premise that all similarly situated creditors should be 
treated alike. The fact that general creditors - the last residual class 
of creditors, for whom much of the bankruptcy operation is run -
share assets or participate in payments on a pro rata basis most di-
rectly embodies this premise. 
Not surprisingly, implementing such a simple approach in a thor-
oughgoing fashion is neither economically nor politically feasible. The 
bankruptcy system lays down a normative principle of equality as a 
baseline around which it builds numerous exceptions. The·Code pro-
motes some creditors ahead of others, providing enhanced collection 
rights for taxing authorities, lessees of residential leases, and the em-
ployees of a failing business, among others.42 This procedure does not 
mean that the Code's commitment to equality is halfhearted. It is 
more accurate - and perhaps more telling - to note that when bank-
ruptcy law deviates from a strict equality principle, it does so for self-
consciously redistributive ends. Every distribution that benefits a par-
ticular creditor at the expense of the collective estate represents a con-
sidered judgment to depart from the norm in a particular instance. 
Equality - and deliberate deviations from equality - stand at the 
center of bankruptcy policy. 
1. Parties with Different Legal Rights 
The framework of the bankruptcy system embodies the principle of 
equality. Within a single bankruptcy case, the consequences of debtor 
default can be determined for a large number of diverse parties, far 
more than could be heard in any state collection suit. Secured credi-
tors and unsecured creditors, creditors with present claims and credi-
42. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1988). 
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tors with contingent claims, creditors with liquidated claims and 
creditors with unliquidated claims all face very different collection op-
tions outside bankruptcy. If the debtor survives to pay everyone, those 
differences may be of little consequence. When the debtor's business 
failure is imminent, however, the disparate classes of creditors all want 
a share of its assets. They recognize that what they cannot get now 
they will likely never get, so they exercise whatever collection rights 
they have as quickly and as vigorously as possible. 
The differences in legal rights among the various creditors listed 
above, however, are quite significant. If these parties had to battle for 
assets under the state law scheme, the distribution of assets would 
heavily favor creditors with security interests, creditors with matured 
obligations currently in breach, and creditors with liquidated claims. 
Contract creditors would enjoy advantages over those whose claims 
are not founded in contract. Creditors who had either too little fore-
sight or too little leverage would find themselves unsecured and at a 
significant disadvantage relative to their secured counterparts. Be-
cause involuntary creditors, such as tort victims and environmental 
cleanup funds, were unable to negotiate in advance for the kind of 
superior treatment at state law that secured creditors demanded, they 
would likely come into the claims process only after others had taken 
the most valuable assets.43 Moreover, because their claims often take 
years to resolve, the period during which the business may fail and 
leave them with nothing to collect is far longer for these creditors than 
for their contract-based, secured counterparts. 
Bankruptcy law avoids this priority scheme by bringing all the 
competing creditors into a single forum, where their competing claims 
can be resolved. Claimants with matured claims and those with con-
tingent claims, those with liquidated claims and those with unliqui-
dated claims, and those with negotiated rights and those with rights 
found elsewhere in law are all heard in a single bankruptcy case.44 
Assets and losses can be distributed among them on a principled basis, 
replacing the differing treatment they would have received under state 
law. 
2. Parties with No Formal Legal Rights 
Bankruptcy policy also takes into account the distributional im-
43. Some states have recently begun to recognize these implications of their state law collec· 
tion schemes and have enacted state environmental cleanup laws that take precedence over se· 
cured debt. See, e.g., Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-9.3 
(West 1991). 
44. 11 u.s.c. § 101(4) (1988). 
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pact of a business failure on parties who are not creditors and who 
have no formal legal rights to the assets of the business. Business clos-
ings affect employees who will lose jobs, taxing authorities that will 
lose ratable property, suppliers that will lose customers, nearby prop-
erty owners who will lose beneficial neighbors, and current customers 
who must go elsewhere. Congress was acutely aware of the wider ef-
fect of a business failure on the surrounding community, and it 
adopted the 1978 Bankruptcy Code specifically to ameliorate those 
harmful effects45 - that is, to redistribute the benefits that would stem 
from some creditors' collection rights to other parties who did not en-
joy those rights. 
The Code accounts for the rights of other parties that a business 
failure affects by giving a failing company an opportunity to sell itself 
as a going concern in chapter 7 or to reorganize in chapter 11. To the 
extent that it reallocates assets from a particular party to the group as 
a whole, thereby enabling the sale of an intact business or a reorgani-
zation effort, the Code carries out a deliberate distributional policy in 
favor of all those whom a business failure would have hurt. The 
choice to make bankruptcy "rehabilitative" represents a desire to pro-
tect these parties along with the debtor and creditors who are more 
directly affected. 
To be sure, the protection the Code gives to parties without formal 
legal rights is derivative in nature and limited in scope. These groups 
have no specific right to be heard in the bankruptcy case, nor can they 
exercise any rights either to support or to oppose a proposal for the 
disposition of the failing business.46 The Code leaves those decisions 
to the parties more immediately affected - the debtor and the parties 
with formal rights against the debtor. Those directly affected bear the 
most identifiable costs, and collectively they presumably make the 
most rational decisions regarding the long-term survival of the busi-
ness. The Code protects the interests of parties without formal legal 
45. Congressional intent is always a slippery concept, but the comments surrounding the 
adoption of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code leave no doubt that Congress understood the deliberately 
broader impact of the bankruptcy system. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY 
LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-62 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6014-23 (letter from Judge Conrad Cyr explaining the community impact of 
several pending bankruptcy cases, in response to a congressional request); REPORT OF THE-COM-
MISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, PT. 1, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1973) (discussing the "overriding community goals and values" of bank-
ruptcy); 124 CONG. REC. 33,990 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (discussing "the public 
interest" beyond the interests of the disputing parties); 124 CoNG. REC. 32,392 (1978) (statement 
of Rep. Edwards) (discussing efforts to "protect the investing public, protect jobs, and help save 
troubled businesses"). 
46. The state attorney general may appear and be heard on behalf of consumer creditors if 
the court determines the appearance is in the public interest. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2018(b). 
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rights only indirectly, largely through provisions that forestall liquida-
tion to permit the business to remain in operation and to reorganize, 
instead of being shut down by a few anxious creditors.47 
The rationale for protecting parties without formal legal rights 
may simply be political in nature; such protection encompasses a 
wider range of voters than the particular creditors who would profit 
from the immediate enforcement of their rights. Moreover, some of 
the parties without formal legal rights have well-organized political 
clout. The presence of a few clear giveaways to successful lobbying 
groups48 makes it clear that the Bankruptcy Code is no more immune 
to political influence than any other legislation Congress passes. On 
the other hand, many of the beneficiaries of the indirect protection for 
parties without legal rights are, at best, only loosely organized groups 
that have shown little interest in the bankruptcy laws. 
Notwithstanding whatever cynicism is appropriate about congres-
sional motives, it remains the case that the protection of parties with-
out legal rights also reflects a more profound economic reality: the 
parties with formal legal rights never completely internalize the full 
costs of a business failure. Any attempt to avoid haphazard liquida-
tion helps offset the losses imposed on parties to whom the costs have 
been externalized as well. Moreover, the attempt to protect these par-
ties reflects a judgment that it is beneficial to protect more than the 
goods that are traded by private contract. For example, much value is 
to be gained by encouraging parties to establish continuing relation-
ships that contracts have not formalized. To presume either that only 
contract-based relationships convey value or that only the value of 
such relationships should be relevant to the policy goals of a legal sys-
tem ignores this reality. The protection offered to parties without for-
mal rights may be indirect and incomplete, but that does not mean 
that such factors are - or should be - irrelevant to policymaking. 
47. This observation leads to a question of application: Should a judge base a decision specif-
ically on the interests of these parties without formal legal rights? Some judges believe they can 
discern and protect the public interest. I would argue that they should not go beyond the statu-
tory mandate to permit a reorganization effort bounded by enumerated legal constraints. To 
enlarge those rights beyond the estate's opportunity to reorganize risks upsetting the balance of 
interests established by the legislature. This reasoning is, of course, only a process argument. It 
is noteworthy, however, that the 1978 Code eliminated language from the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898 that permitted the court either to confirm or reject plans in large reorganization cases based 
on whether they were "consistent with public policy" or to prohibit rejection of contracts "in the 
public authority." 11 U.S.C. §§ 516(1), 616(4), 621(5) (1976) (repealed 1979). A different nor-
mative question arises when the legislature considers enlarging the rights of these parties. 
48. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507{a)(5)(B) (1988) _(priority repayment for U.S. fishermen from fish 
storage and processing facilities). 
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3. Other Distributional Principles 
Bankruptcy enlarges the scope of distributional issues by resolving 
in a single setting the interests of parties with competing legal claims, 
parties with different kinds of legal claims, and parties with no legal 
claims at all. A number of principles are applied to justify deviations 
from the baseline equity-is-equality principle and to implement a pref-
erence for orderly sale and reorganization. These principles isolate 
competing values with which the bankruptcy system is concerned, 
particularly those associated with preserving the estate and minimiz-
ing the costs of default. The following list may not be exclusive, but it 
identifies a number of the key factors: 
a. Relative ability to spread the risks of default. Some creditors 
and parties affected by business failure are unlikely to have anticipated 
the risk that a business will cease to function, while others may face 
especially acute difficulties in spreading the risks of a debtor's default. 
Employees, for example, may be particularly ill-suited for the task of 
assessing and spreading risk in order to shield themselves from the 
effects of their employer's misfortunes. In theory, an employee might 
work for a hundred different employers, scattered among different in-
dustries and different geographic regions, thereby spreading the risks 
of default as bank lenders do. Markets, however, are sufficiently im-
perfect that any such scheme could exist only in an academic paper. 
Priority of repayment for past due wages gives employees preferential 
treatment, 49 reducing their costs when a business fails and permitting 
some correction for costs that market imperfections imposed on them. 
The Code provides a second, indirect protection for employees. By 
giving businesses the opportunity to reorganize, the Bankruptcy Code 
may permit employees to keep their jobs. This provision creates an 
alternative method to reallocate the risks of business failure away from 
the employees toward other lenders who can better diversify their in-
vestment portfolios. 
b. Encourage investment risk taking. If investors perceived that 
businesses in some financial trouble faced immediate liquidation, they 
would likely have two responses: they would not invest their money to 
start businesses, or they would direct their business investments to-
ward less risky enterprises.50 To the extent that reorganization alter-
49. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1988). 
50. A number of commentators have speculated that high management turnover rates when 
businesses fail may already cause management to pursue risk-averse strategies that result in be-
low-optimum rates of return. See, e.g., Irwin Friend & Larry H.P. Lang, An Empirical Test of 
the Impact of Managerial Self-Interest on Corporate Capital Structure, 43 J. FIN. 271, 271 (1988) 
(discussing problem of management's "maintaining a low debt ratio to avoid bankruptcy possibil-
ity" even when higher debt would be in shareholder's interest); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk 
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natives exist, companies that pursue risky alternatives have an 
opportunity to survive some short-term dislocations and a greater 
chance to see their risk-taking strategies pay off.51 At the margins, 
any law permitting reorganization of a business increases the likeli-
hood of survival of companies through troubled times, which makes 
risk-taking behavior more attractive.52 
c. Incentive effects on prebankruptcy debtor-creditor transactions. 
A number of Code provisions are created with a view toward their ex 
ante incentive effects, with a particular focus on the period that pre-
cedes the business' collapse. To encourage creditors to work with a 
failing debtor and to avoid the state law asset grab that wastes assets 
and pushes many debtors into bankruptcy, bankruptcy laws are 
designed to negate the benefits a creditor gains by dismantling a trou-
bled debtor. The Code voids prebankruptcy collection actions that di-
minish the estate and hasten its demise, while it sanctions transactions 
that tend to benefit the estate. For example, collection on an under-
secured debt shortly before bankruptcy may be undone, and the credi-
tor who moved ahead of its cohorts will have to repay its gain to the 
general pool. 53 Meanwhile, a security interest given to secure a new 
extension of credit will survive a bankruptcy filing. 54 
d. Similarity over time. The bankruptcy system equalizes the 
treatment of creditors and parties affected by business failure when 
Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991) (noting 
that managers are more risk averse than the company's investors). 
51. If the phrase "risk-taking strategies" conjures up visions of people in checked suits, sell-
ing swampland with great potential, it is somewhat misleading. "Risk-taking" stretches across a 
range of activities from start-up businesses, which are subject to statistically high failure rates, to 
farming activities, which depend on unpredictable weather. 
52. For those who recall my criticism of Bradley and Rosenzweig's assertion that managers 
were misbehaving by taking on too much risk because of the possibility that bankruptcy would 
save them, I should highlight the distinction. Warren, Untenable Case/or Repeal, supra note 5. 
Bradley and Rosenzweig argued that changes in the 1978 Code that left managers in control of 
their bankrupt companies created incentives for them to take on high-risk projects. Bradley & 
Rosenzweig, supra note 34, at 1047. Consequently, business failure was made "endogenous" in 
ways that had not existed previously. Id. I argued that the available empirical evidence contra-
dicted such a conclusion. First, it showed very high managerial turnover rates post-Code that 
made their inference of inappropriate managerial incentives counterfactual. Warren, Untenable 
Case for Repeal supra note 5, at 449-52. Second, management turnover rates rose rather than 
dropped after adoption of the Code, which directly negates their hypothesis that changes in the 
Code prompted inappropriate managerial strategies. Id. at 452-54. I did not argue, nor would I, 
that the presence of a workable bankruptcy system has no effect on the investment strategies a 
business should pursue or that their investors should demand. Here, I argue that businesses may 
pursue optimal investment strategies - including higher-risk strategies - if bankruptcy laws 
offer the business some protection in case of misstep. 
53. I 1 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988) (making payment to an undersecured creditor within 90 days 
of filing a voidable preference). 
54. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (1988) (insulating a security interest, given within 90 days of filing, 
from voidable preference attack if the debtor used the new extension of credit to purchase assets 
for the estate). 
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timing variations leave them with very different formal rights. For 
example, those who have been injured by a debtor's product, such as 
workers who have been exposed to asbestos, can bring state law ac-
tions only after their injuries are manifest. In the case of a failing 
company, this rule leaves early claimants paid in full, while later 
claimants with the same rights discover there is nothing left to collect. 
Bankruptcy law, however, may resolve both present and future claims 
at once, giving comparable outcomes to those with similar legal rights, 
but different timetables for reaching the courthouse. The bankruptcy 
court may approve a plan to pay victims over time using similar proce-
dures and providing similar payouts regardless of when their injuries 
appeared. 55 The Code generally minimizes the consequences of timing 
differences among the debtor's prepetition creditors as it reorders 
claims based on an underlying similarity of rights. 
e. Owners bear the primary costs of business failure. Residual own-
ers of the business have the least protected status in bankruptcy. This 
situation mirrors the principle outside bankruptcy that those who take 
the largest gains if the business succeeds also assume the risk of loss if 
the business fails. Accordingly, the Code permits the owner to retain 
ownership of the postbankruptcy business only if the creditors collec-
tively consent or the business is able to pay all the creditors in full. 56 
f. Minimize disruption of established economic patterns. While 
bankruptcy necessarily reorders the rights of all parties with claims 
against the estate, the Code gives powerful residual protection to the 
most established forms of transactions, thereby reducing the impact of 
a bankruptcy filing on ordinary commercial expectations. Secured 
creditors provide a case in point. The Code might have provided that 
they receive nothing more in bankruptcy than their unsecured coun-
terparts, thereby giving greater force to other normative principles 
identified here. Nonetheless, the secured creditors are the most 
overtly protected parties in the bankruptcy process. 57 While presump-
tions about ex ante incentives might justify the decision to extend such 
protection to secured creditors, it also seems that Congress feared that 
equalization of creditor status in bankruptcy would 'disrupt commer-
cial expectations. 5s 
This list is not exhaustive. Other elements in the distributional 
55. 11 u.s.c. §§ 101(9), 502 (1988). 
56. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1988). Owners may participate in the postreorganization 
business only if they pay their creditors in full, their creditors consent, or they purchase new 
equitable ownership. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a), (b) (1988). 
57. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988) (describing the calculation of a secured claim) with 11 
U.S.C. § 502 (1988) (describing calculation of an unsecured claim). 
58. See, e.g., Klee, supra note 35, at 46-49. 
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scheme clearly represent the kind of special interest legislation that 
lacks any principled support. 59 The list, however, provides a sense of 
the key normative objectives and illustrates how distributional norms 
are important in delineating the rights of each party in bankruptcy. 
The development of a list only begins the policy inquiry. It does 
not explain how far to pursue a goal - should we reallocate all the 
resources of a business to parties who are poor risk spreaders? - nor 
does it resolve what to do when goals conflict - for example, owners 
should bear the losses a business failure imposes, but if they are unable 
to participate in a reorganization they may not see bankruptcy as a 
viable alternative, and they may make investment decisions that are 
too risk averse. 60 The failure to yield consistently predictable answers, 
however, does not undercut the progress made by identifying norma-
tive goals that the establishment of a bankruptcy system implicates. 
The equities of equality should not be lightly accepted. For every 
party helped by recognition of a claim that a debtor would have 
delayed long enough under state law to escape payment entirely, and 
for every noncontract claimant who is able to collect a pro rata share 
that would have been otherwise practically impossible to collect, there 
is some other party who lost the benefits it enjoyed in the hierarchical 
system of state law. The communitarian quality of bankruptcy 
prompts appropriate howls from the parties who did better on their 
own. Equalizing the treatment of various parties dealing with a failing 
creditor, however, is not a redistributional idea that a bunch of post-
New Deal liberals invented. More than a hundred years ago, the 
Supreme Court listened to the complaints of bondholders whose col-
lection rights were curtailed in a railroad reorganization. It 
responded: 
Bankrupt laws have been in force in England for more than three centu-
ries, and they had their origin in the Roman law. The Constitution ex-
pressly empowers the Congress of the United States to establish such 
59. The special rights enjoyed by shopping centers against their bankrupt tenants, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 365(b)(3) (1988), and the repayment priorities for U.S. fishermen and grain growers against 
their bankrupt elevator storage facilities, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5) (1988), are hard to explain by any 
principled analysis. 
60. It might be worth noting that similar questions of degree and balance exist in efficiency 
analysis as well. Sometimes the questions are posed as indeterminacy questions - for example, 
what to do when we cannot know how costs are externalized - and sometimes as empirical 
questions - for example, what to do when we do not know which party can pass along costs 
most effectively. Efficiency-based analysis may not highlight its inability to answer all questions. 
When one pushes much beyond the first-level analysis, however, as is required for policy imple-
mentation questions, it quickly becomes clear that one must make difficult choices with incom-
plete information. See Kennedy, Entitlement Problems, supra note 8, at 388-89 (arguing that 
efficiency arguments are political and all policy choices involve value judgments); Warren, Bank-
ruptcy Policy, supra note 5, at 803-04 (claiming that economic analysis in bankruptcy encom-
passes distributional consequences even when the author denies any distributional intent). 
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laws. Every member of a political community must necessarily part with 
some of the rights which, as an individual, not affected by his relation to 
others, he might have retained. Such concessions make up the consider-
ation he gives for the obligation of the body politic to protect him in life, 
liberty, and property. Bankrupt laws, whatever may be the form they 
assume, are of that character.61 
That secured creditors, for example, lose some collection rights in 
bankruptcy is neither new nor remarkable. Indeed, some observers 
note that such creditors participated actively in shaping the 1978 
Bankruptcy Reform Act so that their interests would be well pro-
tected. 62 The kinds of redistribution this analysis contemplated are 
bound to provoke controversy and dissent, with all sides invoking 
"fairness" arguments. The point of this analysis is that bankruptcy is 
a forum in which everyone parts with some rights in order to partici-
pate in a process that works for the collective good. 
C. A System To Internalize the Costs of Failure to the Parties 
Dealing with the Debtor 
The third normative function the bankruptcy system serves is to 
constrain externalization of business losses to parties not dealing with 
the debtor. Like the other two principles, this one is followed in gen-
eral direction only, and some counterexamples clearly appear in the 
Code. Nonetheless, the bankruptcy laws are organized to minimize 
losses to the general public when a business fails and to force parties 
dealing with the failing debtor to bear the burden of the failure. 
The benefits of such a policy are obvious. Creditors' ability to ex-
ternalize losses significantly blunts their incentives to make carefully 
considered lending decisions or to monitor the debtor to assure repay-
ment. If a lender knows it must bear the bulk of the losses, the lender 
is more likely to develop appropriate levels of investigation and moni-
toring ex ante. With greater certainty of riskbearing and a reduced 
load on the public fisc, incentives are higher to achieve appropriate 
diligence and caution in debtor-creditor relations. 
Bankruptcy restricts externalization of costs in three key ways: (1) 
it provides priority repayment of debt to the public fisc ahead of most 
other creditors; (2) it maintains a largely self-supporting implementa-
tion system; and (3) it insulates Congress from pressure to fund 
bailouts for individual business failures. 
61. Canada S. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 536 (1883). 
62. See Klee, supra note 35, at 46. 
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1. Priority Repayments to the Public Fisc 
Bankruptcy policy minimizes losses to the public fisc in an obvious 
way: it requires payment first and in full to government taxing author-
ities. A number of different provisions governing the repayment of tax 
debt implement this requirement. Outside bankruptcy, the govern-
ment has fairly strong collection powers that it exercises primarily 
through its power to enforce liens against property. A taxing author-
ity can secure a lien against a debtor's property if the debtor is delin-
quent on its tax obligations. Bankruptcy law gives force to these liens 
after filing, exempting them from the ordinary provisions on avoidable 
preferences during the ninety-day period before filing. 63 
In addition to lien protection, taxing authorities enjoy a repayment 
priority in bankruptcy. While most unsecured creditors can do little 
more than participate in a pro rata distribution of assets and see their 
remaining debt discharged, a court cannot confirm a chapter 11 plan 
unless the tax debts are scheduled for repayment in full. 64 Taxing au-
thorities need not even take the risk that the debtor will promise to 
repay its taxes and later default during the reorganization process. A 
debtor must pay priority taxes at the time of confirmation or within six 
years of the claim's assessment, 65 even though nearly every other cred-
itor can be forced to wait for payment for longer periods during the 
course of the reorganization. In addition, the Code provides an in-
dependent ground for objecting to a plan that meets all the other re-
quirements of plan confirmation if the court determines that "the 
principal purpose of the plan is the avoidance of taxes."66 
Finally, if the debtor's property is insufficient to satisfy a tax lien or 
if the taxing authority did not move quickly enough to get a lien before 
filing, discharge cannot extinguish priority tax debt, unlike nearly all 
other debts. 67 The obliteration of nearly every other claim - the 
bankruptcy discharge - is powerless against priority tax debt. 
The pursuit of repayment of government debts is not single-
minded. The Internal Revenue Code contains a number of provisions 
that offer some tax relief for failing companies, particularly if the com-
63. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6) (1988). 
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1988). Even in chapter 7, the Code requires that priority tax 
debts be paid ahead of most other unsecured debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 507{a)(7) (1988). 
65. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1988). Preferential treatment extends only to tax debts that 
fit within the technical requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7). Such priority tax debts comprise 
most outstanding tax claims, but they do impose some timing requirements that require the 
taxing agency to move within prescribed time limits. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988). 
66. 11 u.s.c. § l 129(d) (1988). 
67. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(7), 1129(a)(9)(C) (1988). 
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panies reorganize their debts in bankruptcy. 68 Obviously, such assist-
ance externalizes the costs of a business failure. Moreover, most 
nontax obligations owed to the government do not receive similar pri-
ority. For example, bankruptcy law treats damages stemming from 
the debtor's breach of a contract with the government the same as 
unsecured debt held by nongovernment parties. Nonetheless, the gov-
ernment's biggest revenue source - taxes - receives aggressive pro-
tection in bankruptcy. 
The issue of protecting the public purse continues to evolve. As 
more businesses fail while owing the government huge sums for the 
cleanup of their environmental messes, and as more troubled compa-
nies try to subsidize the costs of operating their underfunded pension 
plans with money from federal insurance programs, the possibility of 
shifting costs from the private to the public domain moves beyond the 
issues dealt with in current tax laws. Courts are struggling over ques-
tions about the discharge of cleanup liabilities and the priority repay-
ment of pension obligations.69 The Code was written at a time when 
the possibility of shifting the costs of such huge liabilities was not yet 
an obvious threat to the public fisc - or an attractive strategy for 
troubled companies. Not surprisingly, Congress is considering action 
in both areas to force the companies and their creditors to bear such 
costs, rather than permitting the parties to shift those costs to the 
taxpayers. 70 
68. For a more complete discussion of the rules on loss carry forward and carry back, NOLs, 
and other tax exotica, and how these rules affect taxes actually paid by failing companies, see 
Jack Salomon, Part XVI: Bankruptcy and Taxes, in 2 BANKRUPTCY: TEXT, STATUTES, RULES 
(Robert E. Ginsberg & Robert D. Martin eds., 3d ed. 1992). Note, however, that Congress seems 
less inclined to support such subsidies. In July 1993, it repealed a stock-for-debt exception in 
bankruptcy that will eliminate some tax advantages enjoyed by reorganizing companies. Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13226(a), 107 Stat. 312, 487. 
69. See, e.g., WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 12, at 783-85 (discussing the current diffi-
culties with pension plan funding); Katherine Heidt, The Automatic Stay in Environmental 
Bankruptcies, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69 (1993) (discussing current problems with halting govern-
ment enforcement of environmental cleanup obligations). 
70. For a discussion of proposals to deal with environmental claims, see, for example, Daniel 
Klerman, Earth First? CERCLA Reimbursement Claims and Bankruptcy, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 
795 (1991); James N. Lawlor, Comment, Toxic Tug-of-War: Environmental Cleanup Costs, 
Bankruptcy and the Administrative Expense Priority - Is It a Collision of Conflicting Policies or 
Just Plain Confusion?, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 832 (1991); Lynn T. Manolopoulos, Note, A 
Congressional Choice: The Question of Environmental Priority in Bankrupt Estates, 9 UCLA J. 
ENVTL. L. & POLY. 73 (1990). For a proposal to deal with retiree claims, see S. 540, 103d Cong., 
1st Sess. § l 15(a) (1993) (treating pension plan contributions as administrative priority expenses 
in bankruptcy, thereby reducing government subsidization); Retiree Benefits in Bankruptcy: 
Oversight Hearing on H.R. 5283 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Com-
mercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986); Retiree Health 
Benefits: The Fair-Weather Promise: Hearings Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1986); Dan Keating, Good Intentions, Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance 
Benefits in Bankruptcy, 43 VAND. L. REV. 161 (1990). 
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2. A Self-Supporting System 
The bankruptcy system offers significant services to the parties in-
volved with a failing company: it provides courts and associated per-
sonnel to hear parties' disputes, but it also requires those courts to deal 
with an extensive list of uncontested matters that arise in the course of 
a liquidation or reorganization. In addition, a filing office maintains 
significant public information about the debtors' financial circum-
stances; court-appointed officials monitor all chapter 7, chapter 12, 
and chapter 13 cases; court-appointed trustees run some chapter 11 
cases; and a designated officer of the Justice Department - the U.S. 
Trustee - supervises trustees, provides additional monitoring of chap-
ter 11 debtors, and intervenes in appropriate cases. Notwithstanding 
the far greater expenditure of resources than most civil actions require, 
these special bankruptcy features are largely self-supporting. 
The U.S. Trustee system is particularly notable because, unlike 
most systems associated with court processes, it actually turns a profit 
for the government. Currently, every bankruptcy case yields a fee for 
the Trustee system.71 These fees generated $115.7 million during fiscal 
year 1992, compared with the program's estimated expenses of $81.2 
million.72 Although the system is relatively new, the fees exceeded the 
costs of running the offices of the U.S. Trustee by a large enough mar-
gin so that the government took $24.5 million out of the U.S. Trustee 
fund and transferred it to the general treasury on November 1, 1992.73 
Cross-subsidization clearly occurs in all governmental functions, but 
the U.S. Trustee system illustrates a startling anomaly: bankrupt 
debtors subsidize taxpayers generally. 
Private trustees, appointed in all chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases, 
receive a fee from the receipts of the case. A large proportion of chap-
ter 7 cases yields no fees, 74 so that the trustee collects only a portion of 
the filing fee as compensation. An informal compensation system ex-
ists, nonetheless, in which trustees can count on occasional big cases 
that will yield substantial fees, in part to make up for carrying a 
71. There is no in forma pauperis in bankruptcy. If a debtor cannot pay the filing fee, the 
debtor cannot file. The fees are substantial. The U.S. Trustee collects from the filing fees of each 
debtor: chapter 7 ($30), chapter 13 ($30), chapter 11 ($300), and chapter 12 ($100). In addition, 
the government requires quarterly fees based on the debtor's disbursements from every debtor 
with a pending chapter 11 case. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRUSTEE, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE 
SYSTEM FUND 2 (Oct. 27, 1992) (report on file with author). 
72. Id. at 4. 
73. Id. at I. 
74. A study of bankruptcy petitions for individual debtors in the Eastern District of Virginia 
revealed that 95.6% of the chapter 7 petitions filed involved no-asset cases. Michael I. Herbert 
& Domenic E. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia: The Distribution of Assets in Chap-
ter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed During 1984-1987, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 303 (1988). 
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number of small cases which are not cost effective. This process cre-
ates yet another cross-subsidization in bankruptcy: trustees' fees for 
administering and monitoring the bankruptcy system are paid in part 
by the parties in the instant case and are subsidized in part by parties 
to other bankruptcies who make the overall operation of the private 
trustees' practices profitable. In no case, however, does the public at 
large bear these fees. 
Some bankruptcy courts, particularly those in high volume areas, 
have shifted even more of the costs of operating the system to the par-
ties. In large cases, the court sometimes requires the parties to pay a 
portion of the cost of the court's staff directly. In the mid-1980s, Con-
gress passed legislation permitting the bankruptcy court to use assets 
of the bankruptcy estate to pay for facilities or services necessary for 
case administration. The court administrator might hire clerks or 
lease space, for example, and charge the expenses directly to a debtor's 
estate.75 The use of this provision varies, but the costs that the parties 
bear in the largest chapter 11 cases have been substantial. 
Bankruptcy laws even make the operation of the bankruptcy 
courts partially self-supporting. The total cost for the bankruptcy sys-
tem for fiscal year 1992 is estimated at $375 to $400 million,76 includ-
ing personnel costs, real estate costs, security, and so on. During the 
same period, the bankruptcy courts took in nearly $129 million, a sub-
stantial portion of their overall costs. In addition to the filing fees, a 
portion of which the bankruptcy system keeps, debtors and their credi-
tors using the system pay copy fees, bankruptcy-notice fees, fines, pen-
alties, forfeitures, interest on deposits, registry fees, fees for judicial 
services, and a number of miscellaneous fees.77 While the general tax-
payer obviously contributes to the costs of keeping a bankruptcy court 
open, the fees imposed on those who use the system minimize the tax-
payer costs. 
3. Political Insulation 
The bankruptcy system also forces greater internalization of costs 
by providing a mechanism to deal with failing companies and the 
enormous claims against them in a manner that discourages the par-
ties from demanding a public bailout. The Chrysler story illustrates 
75. 28 U.S.C. § 156(c) (1988). 
76. Letter from Mark J. Silver, Program Manager, Bankruptcy Administrator Program, Di-
vision of Bankruptcy, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Elizabeth Warren 
(Mar. 23, 1993) (on file with author). 
77. Id. The numbers listed here do not include $32 million in deposit funds held by the court 
at the end of the fiscal year. Id. 
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why Congress needs help in resisting such demands. 78 
In the late 1970s, Chrysler Automotive faced increasing financial 
troubles. Years of mismanagement, combined with declining sales and 
pressure from foreign car manufacturers, left Chrysler facing default 
on its massive loan obligations. As the crisis deepened, management 
devised a strategy to renegotiate Chrysler's debt, but its financial con-
dition was too shaky to warrant extensions of the credit it required. 
Chrysler responded with a public relations campaign intended to 
demonstrate the impact of its impending failure. Spokespersons talked 
about jobs that would be lost, suppliers that would be put out of busi-
ness, and banks that would go down with Chrysler if it failed. The 
campaign was not directed at their lenders, however. Instead, 
Chrysler focused its efforts on the federal government, asking for loan 
guarantees to help it overcome its cash-flow difficulties. Chrysler's 
creditors - joined by Chrysler employees and suppliers - actively 
took up the lobbying effort. They held rallies and participated in or-
ganized letter-writing campaigns. Ultimately, Congress acquiesced. 
After considering the views of the Secretary of the Treasury, the presi-
dent of the United Auto Workers, the governor of Michigan, the 
mayor of Detroit, the vice president of the National Automobile Deal-
ers Association, the executive director of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, and the United States Confer-
ence of Mayors, among others, Congress passed, by a comfortable 
margin, a loan guarantee bill that permitted Chrysler to restructure its 
outstanding debt. 79 Leading economists of different ideological 
and philosophical persuasions - including Milton Friedman, Alan 
Greenspan, James Tobin, John K. Galbraith, and Robert Eisner -
vigorously opposed the rescue mission, a fact of little consequence to a 
Congress facing huge political pressure. 80 
The Chrysler story had a mostly happy ending, at least in the in-
termediate term. Chrysler weathered the crisis, the workers gave up 
some benefits but kept their jobs, Lee Iacocca and his management 
team took fat bonuses, and the company paid back the government 
guarantees in full. Nevertheless, Congress had set a worrisome prece-
dent for federal bailouts. It had agreed to the Chrysler guarantee in 
part because it arose in the transition period between the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898 and the replacement Bankruptcy Code of 1978. Most 
78. See generally MICHAEL MORITZ & BARRETT SEAMAN, GOING FOR BROKE: THE 
CHRYSLER STORY (1981) (describing the details of Chrysler's financial debacle and government 
rescue). 
79. WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX 298-303 (1986). 
80. Id. at 302. 
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observers regarded the old laws as inadequate for the reorganization of 
large, public companies. like Chrysler, and the new Code remained 
untested. 
As the Chrysler saga was unfolding, another highly visible finan-
cial crisis was in the making. The number of people beginning to show 
symptoms of asbestosis were multiplying rapidly. A mounting 
number of successful lawsuits had established that manufacturers us-
ing asbestos in their products had injured their workers for decades, 
and that the likely bill to compensate these victims would run into the 
billions of dollars. Recognizing their financial plight, the asbestos 
manufacturers decided to emulate a proven strategy: go public and 
ask for government help. Their chances of success looked even better 
than Chrysler's. Their victims were more sympathetic, the govern-
ment arguably bore some responsibility because the Department of 
Defense had contracted for much of the asbestos work in the 1940s, 
and the odds of the business surviving and repaying the victims with-
out government help seemed nonexistent. 81 Within twenty months of 
the Chrysler bailout, another industrial giant appeared in Washington 
asking for help. 
This time, however, Congress issued a strongly worded refusal for 
the parties seeking its help: work it out yourselves. Congress re-
minded the asbestos lobby that the federal government was facing its 
own budget crisis, and it recommended a "private solution." The so-
lution of choice was the new bankruptcy code. When Johns-Manville 
filed for bankruptcy - followed by other companies confronting sig-
nificant asbestos liability - it became clear that, at a minimum, com-
panies would have to exhaust their private resources before the 
government would step in with relief. 
Thus, bankruptcy laws give large companies the opportunity to re-
organize. Along with this opportunity come the hopes that creditors 
will eventually be repaid, tort victims will be compensated, and em-
ployees will be able to keep their jobs - all without subsidization from 
the taxpayer. Even if the reorganization effort fails, liquidation in 
bankruptcy involves delay, which gives those who depend on the fail-
ing business a chance for final collection and some time to adjust to 
the losses they will face. The opportunity for the business to reorgan-
ize and its accompanying hope of success allow Congress greater lee-
81. Moreover, the companies could point to the government's earlier development of a na-
tional insurance fund for black lung victims as precedent for help with this specific work-related 
injury. See Black Lung Benefits Act, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 30 
U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)); see generally Allen R. Prunty & Mark E. Solomons, 
The Federal Black Lung Program: Its Evolution and Current Issues, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 665 
(1989). 
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way to withstand the pleading of all those who will be injured by the 
failure of the business. This process, in tum, tends to block the devel-
opment of an ever-growing number of specialized government pro-
grams that externalize the costs of business failure to the taxpaying 
public.82 
D. A Privately Monitored System 
As a mechanism to deal with failing businesses, the bankruptcy 
system offers a number of potential benefits. The preceding sections 
suggest that it fosters substantial enhancement of the value of the 
debtor, so that parties receive more than they would under alternative 
collection systems. It also distributes those assets according to a delib-
erate scheme, offering protection to a number of deserving parties who 
would otherwise receive little. Further, the system forces parties who 
deal with the debtor to bear the burden of their losses without exter-
nalizing them to others. Yet the system can have no practical effect on 
commercial life unless we use it. A crucial feature of the bankruptcy 
system - and one that is essential to implement the other normative 
goals of the system - is that an effective means exists to bring the 
system into play at the appropriate time. 
Both privately and publicly initiated systems are used throughout 
the world to deal with failing businesses. In countries throughout 
Asia and Europe, government or regulatory intervention is the stan-
dard means to cope with insolvent corporations. The American bank-
ruptcy system relies on a different mechanism: recourse to the 
bankruptcy courts is a private affair, available only when the parties 
more directly affected by its operation initiate it. No public resources 
are allocated to monitor debtors' financial conditions or to bring debt-
ors in danger of collapse under court supervision. There are no "debt 
police" to scrutinize the likelihood that a debtor will not pay, nor are 
there state-authorized trustees to impose bankruptcy protection upon 
those at risk. The law leaves debt-collection and asset-distribution 
costs to the private parties who stand to lose or gain as the debtor 
82. The banking crisis makes an interesting counterpoint to the example of business bank-
ruptcy. Banks may not file for bankruptcy relief; instead, when they fail a government agency 
reorganizes them and a government insurance fund pays off their creditors - typically, their 
depositors. The costs of such a system and the perverse risk-taking incentives it creates have 
become evident in recent years. At the same time, it is extraordinarily difficult for the govern-
ment to consider any banking system that would result in less than payment in full for all credi-
tors. See generally Speeches from the Federalist Society Fifth Annual Lawyers Convention: 
Individual Responsibility and the Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 955, 1078-1114 (1992) (speeches 
and discussion of Frank H. Easterbrook, Edith H. Jones, Elizabeth Warren, and Harris 
Weinstein). 
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suffers or prospers. The state merely provides the forum and the pro-
cedures to regulate the parties' efforts. 
The normative preference for private over public initiation has 
many justifications. A private decision to use the bankruptcy process 
is likely to be better than a public decision. Private initiation lets the 
parties with the best information determine whether to use bank-
ruptcy. The parties can assess the degree of risk involved in a transac-
tion and how much debt enforcement they need. If they perceive little 
risk of loss, if the losses are sufficiently small, or if there is little hope 
for greater repayment in bankruptcy, the parties can simply decide not 
to invoke the system. This mechanism not only allocates the costs to 
those most affected by its use, but it also imposes no bankruptcy ex-
pense on parties who perceive no benefit in its use. 83 
A voluntary system also avoids the difficulties that arise when an 
official determination that a party is bankrupt sets the machinery in 
motion. Regulators' mistakes can force a complex bankruptcy scheme 
upon a debtor that could have resolved its problems more simply 
outside bankruptcy. Alteratively, they can cause a struggling business 
that otherwise might have eventually succeeded to fail at once. Reli-
ance on regulators invites both overly aggressive and insufficiently at-
tentive enforcement, imposing error costs on the parties in either 
case.84 
Even if the bankruptcy decision is appropriately made, parties re-
sistant to bankruptcy, either through misinformation or in response to 
competing incentives, may elect to spend a great deal of time and 
money litigating the threshold issue of filing. In that case, they dissi-
pate value that could have been put to productive use in liquidation or 
reorganization. A properly constructed bankruptcy system places the 
bankruptcy decision in the hands of the parties who have superior in-
formation about the finances and the likely future of the business, and 
who will not expend resources to dispute the appropriateness of the 
filing.85 
83. Professor Randal Picker explains this point in greater detail when he argues that the 
benefits of private monitoring justify such debtor incentives as deviations from the absolute prior-
ity rule. Randal C. Picker, Voluntary Petitions and the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U. CJN. L. REV. 
519 (1992). Picker justifies this analysis exclusively on ailocative efficiency grounds as seen 
through a creditors' bargain model. Id. at 525·26. 
84. Once again, the banking system provides an instructive counterpoint. It has had enor-
mous problems establishing an effective monitoring mechanism to close down failing operations 
in just one, highly regulated industry. Problems of ineffective monitoring and high monitoring 
costs, as welI as under- and overenforcement problems, have plagued the system. See, e.g., 
JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 573-77 
(1992); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Mar-
ket for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153 (1988). 
85. One exception has been the recent flurry of litigation, initiated by creditors, over the 
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In most businesses, the debtor best fits the description of the well-
informed decisionmaker.86 The debtor is typically the only party with 
access to full information about its outstanding obligations, future 
business plans, and income projections. While no one is a perfect deci-
sionmaker, the debtor is usually best able to assess how successful the 
business is likely to be in meeting its continuing obligations, and to 
determine whether bankruptcy provides an opportunity to enhance 
the value of the business. 
The system could, of course, have been structured so that bank-
ruptcy would typically be creditor-, rather than debtor-, initiated. 
Such an approach, however, presents a number of problems. Credi-
tors are not as likely as debtors to have immediate access to the de-
tailed information necessary to make the filing decision. They would 
also face significant hurdles in securing current information even if 
they required such information in their initial loan documents. More-
over, creditors with the best information are likely to be sufficiently 
sophisticated and alert to have protected themselves thoroughly at 
state law. As a result, the creditors best able to act are the ones least 
likely to want to move toward the collective process of bankruptcy. 
To the extent that bankruptcy operates to redistribute value to less-
active creditors, it requires some mechanism to initiate a bankruptcy 
proceeding that does not depend on creditor activity. Finally, credi-
tor-initiated petitions, like those that government regulators initiate, 
would likely trigger disputes over the appropriateness of the filing, 
which would consume assets and cause delay. It may be entirely ap-
propriate to permit creditors to initiate bankruptcy petitions when 
they are so motivated, but a system that relies on creditor initiation 
will likely be costly and underutilized. 87 
While a debtor may have the information to make the best decision 
about entering bankruptcy, there are substantial reasons for a debtor 
to resist a bankruptcy filing. The normative rationalization for bank-
ruptcy often favors the interests of the creditors at the expense of 
either the shareholders or the managers of the business. The Code 
appropriateness of providing bankruptcy relief for a debtor with a single asset and a single credi· 
tor. Typically, these cases involve real estate deals - for example, involving apartment houses 
or office buildings - that have gone sour, and a creditor who plans a simple foreclosure at state 
law that is thwarted by a bankruptcy filing. The court litigation focuses on whether such a filing 
is in "good faith." 
86. Both Professors Baird and Picker see the informational advantages that current manage· 
ment has in making the bankruptcy decision. Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bank· 
ruptcy, 11 INTL. REV. L. & EcoN. 223, 228 (1991); Picker, supra note 83, at 535. 
87. In fact, creditors initiate only a tiny proportion of bankruptcy filings, less than one-tenth 
of one percent of the filings. The bankruptcy system is de facto a voluntary, debtor-initiated 
system. See infra note 106. 
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puts an end to much of the strategic maneuvering to avoid creditor 
collection that state collection law would permit. The bankruptcy 
laws give the court and the creditors much greater say in the operation 
of the business than they would have in a state forum. To enhance the 
value of the estate, bankruptcy laws may require selling off the busi-
ness, a move that could leave current management without jobs and 
freeze out old equity altogether. Even if the business survives, the dis-
tributive norms of the Bankruptcy Code are nearly always contrary to 
the interests of the business owners, whom it places at the end of the 
payment line that forms outside the debtor's door in bankruptcy. 
Moreover, at every turn, the Bankruptcy Code makes it clear that the 
debtor has far greater disclosure obligations and is subject to much 
more extensive court supervision than would exist outside bankruptcy. 
Ultimately, managers and owners of a business must face the fact that, 
in filing for bankruptcy, they run a substantial risk of losing control of 
their business entirely and losing whatever value they might otherwise 
have been able to extract from the business. 
In order to stimulate the debtor to initiate bankruptcy proceedings 
at an appropriate point when the business risks economic failure, there 
must be some incentive to attract the business into the bankruptcy 
process. The Bankruptcy Code offers one powerful incentive: the op-
portunity to save a failing business. Bankruptcy halts, at least tempo-
rarily, the debtor's downward slide, providing breathing space within 
which it can try to turn things around. 88 If the debtor wants to at-
tempt to save its business, bankruptcy - with all its attendant restric-
tions and constraints - often offers the only practical opportunity to 
do so. Of course, if the owner of the business prefers to loot it and 
run, sees no hope of recovery, or is intent on turning it over to a par-
ticular creditor, the business will not file for bankruptcy voluntarily. 
In that case, the creditors will either step in and push the debtor into 
bankruptcy, or they will lose whatever protection bankruptcy can offer 
them. In the overwhelming proportion of bankruptcy cases, however, 
the owner or manager wants to stay and work with the failing busi-
ness. As a result, the owner or manager may put the business in bank-
ruptcy or negotiate a consensual agreement in the shadow of the 
bankruptcy laws. 
One of the key reasons for the adoption of the 1978 Code was the 
widespread perception that the old Code was unworkable. 89 Debtors 
perceived that they could not save a business in bankruptcy, and their 
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). 
89. See, e.g .• WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 12, at 190. 
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creditors largely believed that the system dissipated assets and delayed 
payouts unnecessarily. The new Code - chapter 11 in particular -
was designed with an avowed intention to make bankruptcy more at-
tractive to businesses in trouble.90 The Code gives debtors manage-
ment control over the business after filing,91 permission to continue 
the business in ordinary operations,92 the exclusive right to propose a 
plan of reorganization,93 exemption from securities laws when a plan 
is proposed,94 and a number of other options that make it possible to 
operate a business successfully after filing.95 By creating an opportu-
nity for a business to survive its immediate financial crisis, the system 
serves several normative goals, including the objective goal of encour-
aging voluntary submission. 
Here, as in many other instances under the Code, bankruptcy poli-
cies overlap. Value-enhancement norms coincide with voluntary-filing 
norms. For example, Code provisions permit the debtor to preserve 
going-concern value and at the same time give debtors a reason to file. 
Similarly, bankruptcy distribution rules supplant inadequately consid-
ered state law rules while constraining externalization of costs to the 
public fisc. In some cases, however, values may conflict. To the extent 
that the Code bribes management to bring a failing business into bank-
ruptcy, some value presumably transfers, directly or indirectly, from 
the creditors to the managers. It is a legitimate subject of inquiry to 
explore whether the Code uses appropriate incentives to encourage op-
timal use of the system at the lowest cost. 96 
90. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION REPORT, 
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1977) ("Proposed chapter 11 recognizes the need 
for the debtor to remain in control to some degree, or else debtors will avoid the reorganization 
provisions in the bill until it would be too late for them to be an effective remedy."); H.R. REP. 
No. 595, at 233-34 (recognizing debtors' concerns that a standard leading to frequent appoint-
ments of trustees would prevent debtors from seeking relief under chapter 11). 
91. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988). The debtor-in-possession may be replaced for cause at any time 
after commencement of the case and before confirmation of a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988). 
92. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (1988); see also 11 U.S.C. § l 106(a) (1988) (authorizing the trustee to 
investigate the desirability of continuing the business). 
93. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988) (stating that the time of exclusivity for plan proposal is limited 
to 120 days, unless extended by the court). 
94. 11 u.s.c. § 1145 (1988). 
95. Picker focuses on the ability to violate the absolute priority rule as a key attraction for 
managers and shareholders to file for chapter 11. Picker, supra note 83, at 538-39. He may be 
correct that it is good policy to permit such deviations in order to attract debtor filing. Neverthe-
less, it does not follow that allowing the violations was an intentional incentive device, nor does 
Picker claim that it is. The absolute priority rule is still in force in the Code, although participa-
tion of prefiling equity through a so-called new value exception reduces one of the shareholders' 
most significant disincentives for seeking a bankruptcy reorganization. This distinction is noth-
ing more than a footnote to Picker's broader point that it might be good to permit such devia-
tions in order to encourage voluntary filing. 
96. Small businesses with managers and equity who are the same person or have close iden-
tity raise different issues about equity participation than do large businesses run by a professional 
November 1993] Bankruptcy Policy 373 
Identifying the normative principles does not conclude the policy 
exploration. This discussion articulates interwoven rationales for a 
mechanism in which the benefits and burdens combine to create a 
workable system for dealing with the debts of a failing company. It 
offers a framework for evaluating success and failure and the possibil-
ity of determining the empirical questions any substantive evaluation 
of the Code should address. 
III. EVALUATING POLICIES WITH MULTIPLE, ARTICULATED 
OBJECTIVES 
A more careful elaboration of the elements of bankruptcy policy 
serves many functions. In some cases, it may simply reinforce an al-
ready widely accepted norm. For example, the value-enhancement 
principle is sufficiently well accepted that most policymakers need lit-
tle encouragement to adopt procedures they perceive will result in net 
savings. Its inclusion here does little more than add fancy icing to a 
sturdy cake.97 In some cases, however, a more complete elaboration 
of a bankruptcy policy may change how a problem is framed or what 
solutions are proposed. 
The high rate of failure of chapter 11 cases provides an interesting 
case in point. Most observers estimate that about four out of five 
chapter 11 bankruptcy cases fail before a plan of reorganization can be 
confirmed.98 Among these confirmed cases, approximately thirty per-
cent of the plans provide for liquidation of the business. 99 By these 
management team with little equitable ownership. This distinction may be an important area in 
which the two kinds of cases should prompt two kinds of rules. See Warren, supra note 16. 
97. Much of the current enthusiasm over development of a "fast·track chapter 10" stems 
from the desire to cut the costs of small business reorganization by implementing the well-ac-
cepted goals of value enhancement and cost reduction. See, e.g., Judge Small Looks at Small 
Business Reorganizations, 24 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) A4 (Apr. 15, 1993); New Chapter for Small 
lls Proposed, Weekly News & Comment, 22 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR), at Al (Oct. 24, 1991). 
98. Estimates of success vary somewhat, depending on the sample collected and the defini-
tions used. Compare Edward Flynn, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Statistical Analy-
sis of Chapter 11, at 10-11 (Oct. 1989) (unpublished report on file with author) (study of 2400 
confirmed chapter 11 cases 1979/1980-1986, estimating 17% confirmation rate); Susan Jensen-
Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter 11 Plans Consummate? The Results of a Study and Analysis of 
the Law, 97 COM. L.J. 297 (1992) (study of 260 chapter 11 cases filed in Poughkeepsie, New 
York, 1980-1989, reporting a confirmation rate of 17%) and Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in 
Full Control - Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
99, 107 (1983) (study of57 chapter 11 cases from Western District of Missouri in 1980, reporting 
a 27% confirmation rate) with LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 33, at 41 n.105 (study of 46 
largest cases filed during 1979-1988, reporting 89 to 96% confirmation rate) and Flynn, supra, at 
34 (finding a correlation between high asset size and high confirmation rates). Professor LoPucki 
also concluded that size is highly correlated with confirmation success. LoPucki, supra, at 109. 
99. Flynn, supra note 98, at 12. Because one-third of the confirmed plans are liquidating 
plans, Flynn estimates that only 10 to 12% of the chapter 11 filings result in successful reorgani-
zations. Id. at 13. 
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estimates, only about one in ten chapter 11 cases result in a reorga-
nized, surviving business. 100 
Many commentators use this ninety percent liquidation rate as evi-
dence that the chapter 11 system is failing miserably. 101 The initial 
proposition of this essay was that whether a system is failing or suc-
ceeding depends on the boundaries of its original mission. If the goal 
of chapter 11 is simply to keep lots of companies in business, the data 
are indeed damning. 102 If the system has other goals, however, the 
same data may support an inference that the system is successful. 
There is little systematic information about the businesses that fail 
to confirm plans in chapter 11. We might hypothesize, however, that 
these businesses were in such grim financial shape that they were likely 
to liquidate in or out of bankruptcy. 103 These may be the businesses 
that should be shaken out of the economy - the restaurants that serve 
poor food in inconvenient locations, the manufacturers that produce 
inferior products at high prices, and the plumbers who do not fix 
leaks. If that is so, the bankruptcy system works as it should: these 
companies should not - and do not - survive their bankruptcy 
filings. 
The bankruptcy process nonetheless had a significant impact on 
the businesses that filed for chapter 11 but never confirmed a reorgani-
zation plan. The distributional objectives of the Code were clearly in 
100. Publicly traded companies have much higher survival rates in bankruptcy. About 90% 
of the publicly traded companies in bankruptcy confirm a plan of reorganization. There is also 
evidence to suggest that success rates are positively correlated with size. LoPucki & Whitford, 
supra note 33, at 41 n.105 (finding confirmation rate of 89 to 96% among biggest cases filed 
during 1979-1988); Flynn, supra note 98, at 10-11 (estimating a 17% confirmation rate for all 
chapter 11 filings). LoPucki and Whitford as well as Flynn specifically identify size as a critical 
variable in the chapter 11 experience. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 601 
(1993); Flynn, supra note 98, at 33-35. For a discussion of the ways in which large and small 
companies may experience bankruptcy differently, see Warren, Untenable Case for Repeal, supra 
note 5, at 441-43. These differences have little statistical importance in evaluating the system 
because large, publicly traded companies comprise less than one percent of the chapter 11 filings. 
Id. at 441. 
101. See, e.g., Thomas E. Ray, Chapter 13, A Little Surgery Could Go a Long Way, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 1993, at 31. 
102. A 90% failure rate by itself, of course, proves nothing. If the failure rate for the same 
businesses outside bankruptcy would have been 100%, for example, then it would strengthen the 
inference that chapter 11 is effective in saving failing businesses. Notwithstanding this distinc-
tion, most observers believe a 10% success rate is something less than a ringing endorsement for 
the current system. 
103. If the data suggested that businesses in similar condition fail more often when they 
choose chapter 11 than when they try to solve their problems outside bankruptcy, then, of 
course, they would provide grounds for a serious indictment of the chapter 11 system. This 
point, of course, would be true whether the failure rate were 90% or 10%. The comparison that 
makes any inference valid is what happens to similarly situated businesses outside bankruptcy. 
No one has gathered those data, however, so we are left to speculate based only on the little we 
know about the firms in bankruptcy. 
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play. For the cases that were converted to chapter 7 or liquidated in 
chapter 11, the court distributed assets pro rata to the unsecured cred-
itors. Both present and future claimants had the opportunity to be 
heard and to share in any distribution of assets. Creditors could re-
claim assets that had been paid to preferred creditors on the eve of 
filing. Payments that otherwise would have gone elsewhere were made 
to employees, tort claimants, taxing authorities, and pensioners. The 
court and a trustee supervised distribution of the assets to insure that 
it adhered to the federal scheme.104 -Perhaps most critically, those who 
could have killed off the business were kept at bay while the business 
received one last chance to survive and to repay more people and com-
panies that depended on the business. Whether the estate produced 
sufficient assets to pay any of these creditors is unknown, but whatever 
assets the estate generated were distributed to the parties who dealt 
with the debtor according to policies embodied in the Bankruptcy 
Code. 105 
The debtor's trip through bankruptcy may also have increased the 
total value of the assets available to all the parties. The creditors had 
the benefit of collective action, a creditors' committee, and the supervi-
sion of the U.S. Trustee. The debtor was obligated to make a full ac-
counting of its operations - explaining lost assets, revealing valuation 
information, and offering projections of future business. With more 
complete information, the debtors had the chance to seek buyers for 
the business or contemplate cashing in their unpaid obligations to buy 
the business for themselves. State law maneuvers were no longer 
available to the debtor to resist loss of control over the business or to 
fight, asset by asset, over the remaining business. Management could 
no longer sell off assets at bargain rates or divert the assets to favored 
104. If a case is converted to chapter 7, the court appoints a trustee to supervise the liquida-
tion and distribution of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 701 (1988). If the liquidation occurs in chapter 
11, the court may or may not appoint a trustee, but both the U.S. Trustee and the bankruptcy 
court indirectly will supervise the liquidation. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1106, 1107 (1988). 
105. Chapter 11 may serve other functions as well. Even if the case is dismissed rather than 
liquidated in chapter 7, the filing often serves to make the parties understand the seriousness of 
the circumstances and to bring them to the table for a settlement of their differences. Obviously, 
such bargaining takes place in the shadow of the bankruptcy laws, and the outcomes are heavily 
influenced by what each party could get - and lose - if the debtor reorganized or liquidated. 
Even in those dismissed cases, the bankruptcy laws are deeply influential. 
The chapter 11 filing may serve yet another important function: it permits the board of 
directors to show that it has done everything possible to save the business. A very knowledgeable 
practitioner explains why some collapsing businesses file a chapter 11 reorganization rather than 
choosing liquidation: management fears shareholder derivative suits if they liquidate the busi-
ness and their shareholders later decide that the business might have been saved in chapter 11. 
Telephone Conversation with Kenneth Klee ofStutman, Treister, and Glatt, Los Angeles.(Apr. 
1, 1993). This rationale would prompt filings that no one thought had much chance of survival, 
thereby contributing to a high failure rate in chapter 11. In such cases, chapter 11 functions a 
little like a funeral: a chance to declare the body dead and say a few prayers of farewell. 
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creditors. Finally, the parties got their last, best chance to preserve 
the going-concern value of the business through sale or confirmation 
of a plan. 
While the possible benefits from the liquidation of these companies 
are many, it is not clear whether bankruptcy actually accomplished 
any of them. The bankruptcy filing may not, in fact, have enhanced 
the value of the failing business. The debtor may have exhausted the 
assets of the business with strategic delays long before filing, so that 
chapter 11 was just one more maneuver to postpone the day of reckon-
ing. The creditors may have gained little from their collective action. 
In addition, the expedited procedures of bankruptcy may have meant 
little, as the debtor dragged its feet and prolonged its stay in chapter 
11 so long as there were assets to continue paying management salaries 
and attorneys' fees. Moreover, debtors may have thwarted the distri-
butional objectives of bankruptcy by concealing assets more effectively 
than either the trustee or their creditors could discern, or by planning 
their demise long enough in advance to avoid the application of vari-
ous bankruptcy-avoidance provisions. Debtors may even have injured 
the public purse by using bankruptcy to avoid repaying environmental 
cleanup liabilities or to abandon underfunded pension plans that it 
otherwise might have paid. 
An analysis of actual outcomes depends on empirical evidence, 
which is currently missing from the bankruptcy debates. Without that 
evidence we can only speak in terms of opportunities - opportunities 
to preserve value, to distribute it according to a deliberate federal 
scheme, and to reduce the externalization of costs to the public. The 
fact that the empirical evidence is missing, however, does not lead to a 
conclusion that the system has failed. Indeed, the single piece of evi-
dence - ninety percent of the chapter 11 cases are liquidated - sup-
ports an inference that the system works well to liquidate businesses in 
line with bankruptcy objectives. 
We know one more thing about the businesses that were liquidated 
after a chapter 11 filing: the owners of these businesses voluntarily 
brought them into the bankruptcy system, subjecting the business to 
increased monitoring, shared control, and, perhaps, liquidation. 106 It 
is entirely possible that the debtor filed these bankruptcy petitions af-
106. The number of chapter 11 petitions that creditors bring is statistically insignificant. See 
Susan Block-Leib, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why the Number Is Not 
Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 803, 805 n.14 (1991). In 1988, for example, there were 260 
involuntary petitions, id, at 863 app. A, from a total of 18,889 chapter 11 petitions. L. RALPH 
MECHAM, ADMJN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE AD· 
MINJSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 364 (1988). Later editions of the report 
have not tabulated more recent data on involuntary filings. 
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ter a creditor found enough informal leverage or brought a state court 
action that made it impossible to continue to operate the business 
outside bankruptcy. Nonetheless the debtor filed the petitions, which 
eliminated any need to litigate the issue of whether the debtor appro-
priately belonged in the chapter 11 system to resolve its financial 
problems. The government spent no public dollars to force the bank-
ruptcy filing, and any benefits that flowed from the bankruptcy action 
were shared among all those affected by the business' failure. If bank-
ruptcy offers any other benefits, these data suggest that those benefits 
were accomplished with minimal cost through private decisionmaking. 
None of this discussion is intended to suggest, of course, that 
somehow a chapter 11 failure is better than a chapter 11 success. 
Many commentators analyze various aspects of the bankruptcy system 
to explore how it might operate with greater efficiency to reorganize 
more companies.107 I only suggest that, while the system might be 
made better, one cannot conclude that it is failing simply because a 
high proportion of chapter 11 cases liquidate. 
The bankruptcy system is intended to enhance value and to dis-
tribute that value according to a deliberate scheme. Whether it func-
tions effectively to accomplish these aims is a topic of legitimate debate 
-and an appropriate subject for continued empirical study. A ninety 
percent liquidation rate in chapter 11 tells us only that the system is 
processing businesses' failures. That many of these cases began in 
chapter 11 with the hope of a reorganization suggests that the Code 
incentive - the opportunity to reorganize - effectively attracts some 
managers and shareholders to subject their company to the rules of 
chapter 11. A clearer articulation of bankruptcy policy does not tell 
us if the policy has been effectively implemented, but it does identify 
the normative goals that are critical in deeming the system a success or 
a failure. 
IV. CONSTRAINTS ON BANKRUPTCY POLICYMAKING 
It is possible to discuss policy objectives on a number of levels of 
abstraction, but too much abstraction may wash out significant details 
that should have an impact on any policy decision. Obviously some 
level of generality is critical. Without it, there would be little more 
107. One commentator, for example, has focused on poorly conceived tax laws that make it 
more difficult for companies to reorganize. Michelle M. Amopol, Why Have Chapter 11 Bank-
ruptcies Failed So Miserably? A Reappraisal of Congressional Attempts To Protect a Corporation's 
Net Operating Losses After Bankruptcy, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 133, 136 (1992). She proposes 
solutions that she argues will permit more successful reorganizations while maintaining revenues 
and rationalizing the integrity of the tax structure. Id. at 194-97. 
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than a series of sui generis stories with no theme to unite them and no 
guidance for future decisionmaking. On the other hand, discussions 
about bankruptcy policy take place in an area of active political and 
economic debate; if the theorizing removes the policy analysis too far 
from reality, the exercise risks becoming meaningless in helping to in-
form the debates. 
Ultimately, bankruptcy policymaking is not an academic exercise. 
Bankruptcy laws are now in a state of almost-constant revision. Both 
Congress and the courts struggle for a clearly defined bankruptcy pol-
icy to guide them as conflicts among competing considerations become 
sharper, as novel applications of bankruptcy law multiply, and as con-
cern increases over the effects of bankruptcy law on the economy. The 
effort to derive coherence from - and to impose coherence on - the 
bankruptcy system compels ever greater attention to the theories that 
lie at the root of this system. Academics writing about the bankruptcy 
system do not have the luxury of assuming that what they say is not 
important in forming policies. Consequently, they cannot ignore the 
constraints of reality - except as they choose to make themselves ir-
relevant. This policy debate is about real provisions in real laws that 
have a real impact on millions of debtors, creditors, and others who 
are affected by economic failure.10s 
Before I end this essay, I want to touch on two elements that limit 
a meaningful policy debate about bankruptcy: bankruptcy laws oper-
ate in imperfect markets, and bankruptcy operates against a back-
ground of state collection laws that create strategic opportunities for 
resistant debtors. These circumstances shape both the actual forms 
bankruptcy laws can take as well as the aspirational goals bankruptcy 
may embody. To relax these constraints temporarily to explore one or 
another aspect of a hypothetical system may be a useful heuristic de-
vice, but to ignore them in making serious policy proposals presumes a 
counterfactual world that yields little meaningful insight. In this 
sense, the policy discussion of this essay takes its cue from the tradi-
tion of legal realism, asserting that real-world constraints necessarily 
- and properly'- bind bankruptcy policy, and that only in a specified 
factual context does a policy discussion become meaningful. 
108. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, for example, every academic debate about debtors as 
rational actors who respond to statutory incentives was rapidly translated into Jaw in the 1984 
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. State and federal legislatures amended statutes to reduce 
debtor protection in the belief that such moves would reduce bankruptcy filing rates and en-
courage debtors who did file to try repayment in chapter 13. They adopted laws based explicitly 
on the economic analysis prevailing in the scholarly literature. For a discussion of this event and 
the empirical evidence showing the inapplicability of economic principles to guide legislative 
decision making, see Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Laws, Models, and Real People: Choice of Chapter 
in Personal Bankruptcy, 13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 661 (1988). 
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A. An Imperfect World 
We must consider bankruptcy policies in light of their application 
to cases that arise in the real world. It is therefore critical to note that 
the markets bankruptcy affects are not perfect and that they contain 
substantial transaction costs, information asymmetries, and ambigui-
ties about the property rights of the parties. While one might make 
this blanket warning to constrain any policy debate, it is a particularly 
pertinent limitation in the bankruptcy area for two reasons: bank-
ruptcy policy is itself grounded in market imperfections, and critics 
have ignored market imperfections in constructing a hypothetical sys-
tem that is superior to the current bankruptcy system. 
The basis for bankruptcy policy is so deeply rooted in market im-
perfections that any attempt to discuss such policy in a perfect market 
is a zenlike exercise, much like imagining one hand clapping. Bank-
ruptcy laws are created to deal with the problems of market imperfec-
tions. If, in fact, markets were perfect - if debtors and their creditors 
had perfect information about the market generally and each party's 
position within it, if debtors and creditors could costlessly monitor, 
renegotiate, and enforce their agreements, if the legal rights of parties 
were always unambiguous and clear to all actors - then bankruptcy 
laws undoubtedly would take a different form. Many features of the 
bankruptcy system, for example, are intended to deal with creditors' 
inadequate information and the high costs of gathering the informa-
tion they need to make collection decisions. Debtors must disclose 
substantial information about their business operations so that all 
creditors will have low-cost, accurate information to inform their 
oversight and strategic decisionmaking during the bankruptcy pro-
cess.109 If creditors had perfect, costless information, these provisions 
would be superfluous. Like other laws, bankruptcy laws take their 
shape from the problems with which they were created to cope. 
Market imperfections are a critical element in the elaboration of 
any bankruptcy policy because such imperfections undoubtedly play 
an important part in causing the business failures that become the sub-
ject of bankruptcy laws. Some businesses may fail even in a perfect 
market environment. Nevertheless, the stories of distressed businesses 
that end up in bankruptcy are typically stories about high transaction 
costs, information asymmetries, and uncertainty over property rights. 
When Wang Laboratories failed to anticipate the importance of pro-
ducing computers that were compatible with other equipment in the 
109. See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text for examples of cost sharing and cost 
reduction from various Code provisions. 
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marketplace, or when Johns-Manville could not finance its current op-
erations because of the widespread uncertainty about the future tort 
claims it faced, these companies demonstrated the high costs of deal-
ing in markets in which neither they nor their creditors had full and 
perfect information to be able to transact without cost. The stories of 
failure may be depressingly routine or wildly colorful, but they almost 
always repeat the same elements of market imperfection that nearly 
every economic model proposing to analyze solutions to business fail-
ures carefully deletes.110 
Not surprisingly, to test the vitality of a number of economic prin-
ciples, researchers often begin their analysis with the familiar incanta-
tion of a perfect market: a world without those transaction costs, 
information asymmetries, or ambiguous property rights to muddy the 
analytic waters. 111 The assumptions of efficient markets may or may 
not be relaxed later in the argument - which obviously affects the 
effectiveness of any conclusions based on the hypothesis. This ap-
proach is a perfectly sensible way to begin to test the allocative effi-
ciency of a rule of law. Without it, analysts would be mired forever in 
a swamp of conflicting and contaminating factors that would prevent 
them from identifying the incentives that various legal provisions cre-
ate. Nonetheless, any policy conclusions derived under such artificial 
conditions are highly suspect. Unless we subject them to more rigor-
ous testing, including some empirical analysis in those very real and 
very complex markets, they are worth little. 
Such an abstract literature flourishes nonetheless. Articles abound 
in which authors begin with a "simple model of workouts and invest-
ment" that is laden with huge assumptions. 112 Some of the assump-
tions are explicit - "bank renegotiation is assumed to be costless"113 
and "the automatic stay is the only feature of Chapter 11" that makes 
a firm willing to invest114 - while some are not - such as the as-
110. This is not to say that all business failures stem from incomplete information, transac-
tion costs, or ambiguities about property rights. It is possible for a business to suffer some unan-
ticipated event, such as a lightning strike that destroys the business. A committed economist 
might argue that such losses, if uninsured, were the results of incomplete information about the 
likelihood of such a catastrophe or of high transaction costs to obtain such insurance. Neverthe-
less, that debate is not necessary to make the point raised here. 
111. Some of the most interesting analyses of allocative efficiency build on models of bank-
ruptcy that explore market imperfections directly and analyze likely outcomes under such condi-
tions. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of Value in 
Corporate Reorganization, 8 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 253 (1992) (analyzing bargaining between equity 
holders and debtholders when property rights are ambiguous and transaction costs are 
substantial). 
112. See, e.g., Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 4. 
113. Id. at 1196. 
114. Cf id. at 1029. 
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sumption that markets perfectly reflect all information.115 Some au-
thors offer proposals to reduce costs, improve efficiency, and correct 
management incentive problems in chapter 11 by having the bank-
ruptcy court auction off the business by selling "riskless securities."116 
Evidently this device will yield the perfect price for the company with-
out significant transaction costs, freeing the courts to spend time only 
to evaluate claims and distribute assets in accord with the rules of ab-
solute priority.117 Some identify their perfect markets premise but de-
fend their proposals because they would operate "immediately" and 
save the costs currently expended.118 Others propose sweeping re-
forms that put the chapter 11 company up for auction, assuming that 
such a move causes no apparent transaction costs and will perfectly 
yield the value of the company. 119 Others simply deliver the company 
into the hands of its creditors, assuming that such a move will avoid 
collection costs.120 Evidently managers and owners will be infinitely 
compliant in these new systems, handing up their businesses in chapter 
11 at the same rates as they now do, then quietly disappearing. Values 
will also be clear, as new buyers emerge ready to pay in full. 
To be fair, some commentators propose models that ignore trans-
action costs but that propose no special solutions; they simply use the 
models to explore an element of the system and to develop insights 
that might add to an overall understanding of the system.121 Others 
make clear the role of transaction costs and how one must deal with 
them separately, 122 while still other commentators conclude that the 
115. This assumption underlies the analysis of Gertner and Scharfstein. Id. 
116. Cf. Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, 4 J. APPLIED 
CORP. FIN. 13, 32 (1991). 
117. Id. 
118. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 34, at 1054, 1085-86 (emphasis in original). 
119. See Phillippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform (May 1992), (MIT 
Working Paper No. 92-11, on file with author). A variant on this proposal is in Barry E. Adler, 
Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 323-
33 (1993) (proposing "Chameleon Equity" to solve bankruptcy problems through market sale of 
differently structured rights). 
120. Cf. Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of 
Claims, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 285, 300 (1990). 
121. Professors Baird and Picker, for example, use a highly abstract game theory model to 
explore the incentives of parties in a bankruptcy negotiation, but they propose no sweeping 
changes of the bankruptcy laws based on their insights. Baird & Picker, supra note 16. The 
authors base their analysis on strong assumptions about the absence of transaction costs, and 
they explicitly disavow any claim that their analysis necessarily prevails in a more realistic set-
ting. Id. at 347. 
122. Bebchuk, supra note 3. Professor Bebchuk proposes that the debts of a bankrupt com-
pany be canceled, and the stock be divided among senior creditors in proportion to their debt. 
Id. at 784. Junior creditors would have options to buy the stock from senior creditors at the 
price of the debt, and shareholders could buy from junior debt. Id. at 786-87. The stated goal is 
to divide the reorganization pie to reduce inefficiencies that are grounded in valuation problems 
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system is far too complex to fit simple bargaining models. 123 
It is interesting to imagine what kind of market would produce 
enough failure to stimulate an interest in a bankruptcy system but 
would be so perfect that a hypothetical bankruptcy system could oper-
ate without concern for market imperfections. While some tests of 
allocative efficiency may reasonably begin with the presumption of a 
perfectly functioning market, a policy discussion should not begin in 
such a state of grace. To do so limits the sweep of the policy inquiry to 
questions of allocative efficiency and precludes alternate avenues of ex-
ploration at the inception of the journey. Bankruptcy policy discus-
sions should provide ample opportunity to test allocative efficiency 
hypotheses, but they should provide a framework for considering a 
number of other functions of the bankruptcy system as well. 
B. A Dual Collection System 
Another restraint on bankruptcy policymaking is that bankruptcy 
necessarily displaces an alternative collection system. There exists an 
intricate, well-developed collection system, based primarily on state 
laws that govern the collection of debt. 124 The unspoken assumption 
of many commentators that the collection alternatives are either bank-
ruptcy or payment is not true. Nor is it the case that, absent bank-
ruptcy, defaulting debtors would be forced immediately and costlessly 
to hand the business over to their creditors. Instead, the state collec-
tion system and the bankruptcy system provide alternative, formal 
rules for dealing with the collection of debt. Each creates the bases for 
informal leverage and negotiated settlements. Whenever commenta-
tors explore either the direct or indirect costs of bankruptcy, it is im-
in bankruptcy. Id. at 777. Others criticize the work, however, for its failure to deal with transac· 
tion costs and argue that the proposed application is highly problematic notwithstanding Profes· 
sor Bebchuk's disclaimer. Adams, supra note 4, at 152-57. Professor Adams includes Professors 
Baird and Roe and Provost Jackson in his critique of scholars who ignore the important role of 
transaction costs in their proposed alternatives to reorganization. Id. at 142-52. 
123. See, e.g., Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 4, at 1216-17. They employ such models to 
argue for their vision of bankruptcy. Yet they are quite critical of the abstract models of Profes-
sors Baird and Roe and Provost Jackson, dismissing the latter's analysis as too simplistic. Id. 
124. The nonbankruptcy collection system comprises both state and federal elements. State 
law determines the formal collection rights of most contract and tort claimants, while nonban-
kruptcy federal law determines collection rights of certain other parties. The IRS, for example, 
has special collection rights controlled largely by federal collection laws. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6322 
(1988) (giving the IRS a tax lien when a tax assessment is made); I.R.C. § 6323(n) (Supp. III 
1991) (establishing the priority of the IRS tax lien over all other creditors except purchasers and 
creditors with security interests, mechanic's liens, or judgment liens that were previously re-
corded). Notwithstanding a number of federal collection provisions, for ease of discussion the 
nonbankruptcy collection system is frequently referred to as the "state collection system." This 
term emphasizes the variability of the system, which is the key ingredient whether the origin of 
the laws is state or federal. 
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portant to consider the concomitant costs of resolution through the 
state collection system. 
The most salient feature of the state collection system for the pur-
poses of this discussion is its complexity. A creditor attempting to use 
state collection law to obtain and enforce a judgment must follow a 
series of intricate laws that raise substantial barriers to forced collec-
tion. These laws require steps that frequently tip off the debtor about 
impending collection efforts, permitting debtors to move assets to keep 
them out of their creditors' hands. 125 While it is possible to collect 
from the unsophisticated or the cooperative, the laws make it difficult 
to collect from a resistant debtor. A case such as Vitale v. Hotel Cali-
fornia, Inc. 126 illustrates the practical and legal complexity involved in 
collecting an employee's claim for $6317 against a New Jersey restau-
rant. More than two years after he had obtained a default judgment 
against the debtor and after countless collection efforts, Mr. Vitale was 
still struggling for his money - and he was collecting against a cur-
rently operating, apparently solvent business that remained in a single 
location. The Vitale case is remarkable only because it resulted in a 
published opinion; the difficulties the creditor faced were all too 
routine. 
The laws are complex, but the multijurisdictional problems in-
volved in debt collection multiply the complexity. Collection laws 
vary from state to state and, in some cases, from county to county. 
Even if the creditor surmounts the technical hurdles of proving the 
obligation and initiating the formal collection process in one jurisdic-
tion, it faces the possibility that the debtor or the assets will move to 
another jurisdiction.127 The creditor will not have to reestablish the 
underlying debt, but the creditor must initiate the collection process 
anew in the subsequent jurisdiction, making it both more expensive to 
collect and less likely that the creditor will be fully satisfied. 
Debtors have a number of other informal means to resist their 
creditors' collection efforts. They may sell assets at below-market val-
ues to yield quick cash, distribute assets to favored creditors to reduce 
the assets available to complaining creditors, or redeploy assets into 
125. See, e.g., LYNN M. LoPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: TEXT, 
CASES AND PROBLEMS (forthcoming 1994). 
126. 446 A.2d 880 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.), ajfd., 455 A.2d 508 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1982). 
127. Of course, not all assets can be moved. Real estate, for example, stays put, which makes 
it more valuable to attempt to seize. On the other hand, the procedures involved in seizing real 
estate can be highly technical. It can also take a substantial amount of time to terminate the 
interests of the debtor in the property and free it for resale. See, e.g., LoPucKI & WARREN, 
supra note 125. 
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high-risk ventures that will increase the creditors' losses if the venture 
fails. Depending on the precise details, some of these activities may 
violate state collection laws or the creditors' contracts with the debtor. 
That does not mean, however, that such behavior will not occur. 
Creditors can spend substantial assets monitoring their debtors and 
still lose out if the debtor refuses to pay. 
To be sure, not all collection actions end up in a multistate chase 
or a game of hide-and-seek with the debtor's assets. Most collection 
actions are routine affairs in which the biggest impediment to the cred-
itor's successful collection is the debtor's lack of assets. To the extent 
that creditors complain about clever, slippery debtors who elude them 
through bankruptcy, however, it is important to remember that those 
debtors have more than a few opportunities to do the same in the state 
law system. 
The uniform provisions of Article 9 of the U.C.C. lend some con-
sistency to the collection area, but the provisions are more useful in 
creating substantive rights than in streamlining judicial enforce-
ment.128 Nonetheless, creditors with mortgages in real estate or secur-
ity interests in other property frequently prefer the state collection 
system to its bankruptcy counterpart. Their preference is not for the 
convenience of collection at state law. Even creditors with enhanced 
interests, such as mortgagees and secured creditors, face complex and 
sometimes costly collection procedures, albeit procedures that are gen-
erally less expensive than those that unsecured creditors must pursue. 
Their primary benefit is their priority, which permits them to collect 
ahead of all other creditors. 129 Such benefits, however, apply only to a 
small subset of those to whom the debtor may owe significant obliga-
tions. Among the creditors with no practical access to state law col-
lection priorities are nearly all tort victims, trade creditors, employees, 
pensioners, and literally hundreds of other classes of possible claim-
ants against the debtor. Preference for a nonbankruptcy system is 
more often a distributional question rather than a question of effi-
ciency of collection, as is so often posited. 13° Creditors who see the 
state collection system as accessible and superior to the bankruptcy 
128. If the debtor is unwilling to stand by while the creditor uses self-help remedies to repos· 
sess property, the Article 9 creditor is also thrown into the vagaries of state collection law. Arti· 
cle 9 sets forth uniform provisions for the creation of an enforceable security interest and 
provides for creditor self-help if the debtor cooperates. It does not, however, replace the state 
court collection system if the debtor resists repossession. 
129. Kenneth Klee makes the important point that the Bankruptcy Code enhances collection 
for creditors with such security interests by reducing certain risks and costs of collection. See 
Klee, supra note 35. 
130. Warren, Untenable Case for Repeal, supra note 5, at 467-74. 
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system tend to be a small, but powerful subset of all those to whom a 
debtor may owe obligations. 
Notwithstanding the axiomatic element of the observation that 
bankruptcy laws play out against a complex state collection scheme, 
the number of observers who fail to acknowledge that fact as they 
criticize the bankruptcy system or compare it with a "costless" 
nonbankruptcy collection system is legion. One author proposes re-
placing the collective process of bankruptcy with a system of debtor 
distribution of assets131 - a scheme which can evidently force the 
debtor to participate at no cost. Another proposes to take away the 
courts' control over the company's assets and put it back into the 
hands of investors. 132 He proposes to use contractual agreements to 
accomplish this goal - agreements that parties evidently could 
costlessly and perfectly enforce without resort to the courts. Other 
authors give similar primacy to the contractual arrangements between 
debtor and creditor, charging that the bankruptcy laws impose signifi-
cant costs - and evidently assuming that parties would encounter no 
costs in trying to enforce rights granted under these perfectly negoti-
ated contracts. 133 Anyone who routinely reads reports of contract liti-
gation recognizes that such assumptions are not just unrealistic, they 
are demonstrably counterfactual. If the authors of these proposals be-
lieve that debtors who behaved strategically in chapter 11 could not or 
would not examine their contractual obligations for evidence of ambi-
guity, overreaching, and a dozen other litigable issues that would pre-
cede court enforcement, they have an asymmetric view of human 
behavior that is useful only in its ability to reinforce a wholly unrealis-
tic economic model. 
Once again, it is worth noting that much of the affection for con-
tract-based alternatives to bankruptcy may not be due to cost-based 
preferences - although that is the language of the argument - so 
much as they are due to distribution-based objectives. Commentators 
who laud the ability of creditors to decide ex ante by contract what 
will happen to the debtor's assets if the debtor begins to fail demon-
strate a de facto preference for contract-based claimants. All other 
claimants - those who have no opportunity to contract with the 
debtor, or who have little power in their contract negotiations - sim-
131. James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy 
Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097 (1990). 
132. Rasmussen, supra note 4. 
133. Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1992); 
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 34. The two proposals differ in form, but both rely on a 
seemingly costless enforcement of some costlessly negotiated contractual arrangements. 
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ply lose out as one group of creditors secures all the assets for them-
selves. Perhaps collection laws should prefer contract-based claimants 
over all other parties, but that is a debate we should have directly by 
focusing on the distributive implications of contract-based preferences, 
not a result that should be smuggled into the system through an analy-
sis of allocative efficiency. 
The presence of an alternative collection system based on a variety 
of state collection laws is integral to the development of the bank-
ruptcy system. Bankruptcy exists in part to federalize and standardize 
a variety of collection rules and laws. If a single uniform collection 
system replaced the current state law collection system, if all creditors 
had easy access to the current state system, if there were not variabil-
ity among the collection rules of the states, if debtors and creditors 
could not use state law variability as an opportunity for strategic be-
havior, and if the debtors did not have a number of devices to thwart 
creditor collection attempts, then, once again, the shape of the bank-
ruptcy laws would undoubtedly differ from those extant today. 
It is good to criticize any system; constant vigilance in the form of 
vigorous debate is useful to maintain or improve the efficacy of a legal 
regime. The criticism is more meaningful, however, if it takes account 
of the circumstances that constrain the operation of the system. Some 
of the criticism of the bankruptcy system is solidly grounded in the 
circumstances of the system, but a significant portion of the critique is 
not. To model improved systems that operate only in perfect markets, 
or to ignore the high costs of collection outside the bankruptcy system 
when critiquing the high costs of collection in bankruptcy, is to design 
an airplane that carries no payload, flies only in a gravity-free environ-
ment, and consumes no fuel. The exercise may be great fun, but it 
yields little that is useful for those who need to build planes that fly. It 
is important to separate debates about bankruptcy fancy from debates 
about bankruptcy policy. 
CONCLUSION 
The debates over bankruptcy laws are not likely to subside soon. 
As bankruptcy policy continues to impinge on a number of other fields 
- such as tort, environmental liability, labor law, pension rights, 
banking regulation, class actions, director and officer liability, merger 
and acquisition rules, and SEC disclosure regulations - it is likely 
that the volume of the disputes about the bankruptcy system will in-
crease rather than decrease. Bankruptcy policymaking no longer suf-
fers from inattention; the question now is whether it can survive the 
spotlight. 
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Ink has spilled freely in the past few years as a number of critics 
have called for the reform or outright abolition of the bankruptcy sys-
tem, claiming that it has failed and offering some other method for 
dealing with business failures. The critics reassert the theoretical justi-
fications for the bankruptcy system by implication, focusing on how 
the system has failed to meet some thinly articulated goals. 
It is important to expose the inefficiencies, inadequacies, incen-
tives, and errors of the bankruptcy system. Its shortcomings may be 
many, and its operation is sufficiently important to both debtors and 
creditors to warrant thorough academic study and strong public de-
bate. The chapter 1 ls of large, publicly traded cases that have fueled 
much of the debate are important, particularly as these cases become 
the fora for the resolution of a multitude of critical social issues. No 
one should sit back comfortably, assured that we have a well-function-
ing business bankruptcy system. 
In the march through the details of the rules and the attention to 
the megacase, however, it is essential that the larger impact of the sys-
tem not be lost. The bankruptcy system is designed to serve critical 
functions to preserve the value of failing businesses, to distribute that 
value according to deliberately defined policies, and to internalize the 
costs of business failure. The system assists a variety of businesses, 
more than ninety-nine percent of which are not traded publicly traded. 
It also serves literally millions of different creditors and other inter-
ested parties affected by the bankruptcy laws. Because the functions of 
the bankruptcy system are deeply intertwined, a single change has the 
potential to create multiple effects throughout the system. Moreover, 
changes pursued for one end may simultaneously move the system fur-
ther away from a number of other objectives. 
It is appropriate to end this essay by repeating the initial call for 
caution. Debates about bankruptcy policy must be more carefully 
framed to expose their policy presumptions, and any proposal for re-
form should be accompanied by a thoughtful evaluation of its impact 
on the competing policy concerns. It is also appropriate, however, to 
end with a call for a wider exploration of the problems of the system 
- particularly the kinds of problems that do not fit neatly within es-
tablished paradigms. We remain woefully short on reliable empirical 
data about the operation of the system, particularly with respect to the 
routine cases. Our theoretical grasp of the incentives at work for com-
peting parties is primitive at best, and it certainly deserves elaboration. 
In short, there is much to learn. In learning, however, there is much 
known that we should not forget. 
